China's focus on military supply chain security may intensify global tech rivalry, impacting international trade and defense collaborations.
The post China to scrutinize military supply chains amid US rivalry appeared first on Crypto Briefing.
Longsys's Hong Kong listing highlights China's growing influence in the global semiconductor market, driven by AI and tech innovation demands.
The post Shenzhen Longsys Electronics seeks $801M in Hong Kong listing as AI-fueled memory boom drives 71,000% profit surge appeared first on Crypto Briefing.
The significant inflow into crypto funds signals a renewed institutional interest, potentially stabilizing and legitimizing the crypto market.
The post Bank of America reports $3.2B inflow into crypto funds, largest since October 2025 appeared first on Crypto Briefing.
Japan's yen defense faces limits, risking import inflation and financial instability amid persistent US-Japan interest rate disparities.
The post Yen breaches 160 against dollar, raising intervention concerns appeared first on Crypto Briefing.
A coordinated G20 response to China's trade surplus could reshape global trade dynamics, impacting sectors reliant on Chinese exports.
The post US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent urges G20 to address China’s $1.2 trillion trade surplus appeared first on Crypto Briefing.
Bitcoin Magazine

Bitcoin Cools Off After $3 Billion ETF-Driven Surge
Bitcoin slid Friday afternoon, cooling down after a phenomenal run following huge investment from U.S. ETF buyers.
The leading cryptocurrency was trading for $77,379 on Friday afternoon in New York after dropping more than 3% over a 24-hour period.
Bitcoin hit a high this week of $81,281 but slowed down after Federal Reserve Chair Kevin Warsh gave his first major speech as head of the central bank — saying on Friday that he had “more work to do” to fight inflation.
The Bitcoin price has in the past dropped when the Federal Reserve thinks inflation is too high because it means less chance of a rate cut; the leading cryptocurrency typically does better in a low-interest rate environment.
Bitcoin started surging last week after the U.S. Treasury would at least double the size of its liquidity-support buyback operations. The announcement last week hurt the dollar but non-yielding assets have benefited.
Exchange-traded funds, managed by the likes of BlackRock, Fidelity, and Grayscale have received net positive inflows for nine days in a row, according to Farside Investors data. Last week was their best week since October — when bitcoin hit a new all-time high — and that run has continued into this week.
Since August 17, investors have thrown over $3 billion at the funds. BlackRock’s iShares Bitcoin Trust received the lion’s share of the investment, but Morgan Stanley’s new Bitcoin Trust — which debuted this year — also experienced significant inflows.
Analysts have said that the so-called debasement trade — when investors buy an asset as a way to hedge against a currency losing value — was leading investors to eye-up bitcoin again.
Investors taking part in the trade think that bitcoin, gold and other precious metals are a good way to protect themselves from excessive government spending.
Total U.S. debt crossed $40 trillion for the first time this month.
This post Bitcoin Cools Off After $3 Billion ETF-Driven Surge first appeared on Bitcoin Magazine and is written by Mathew Di Salvo.
Bitcoin Magazine

Debasement Trade Is Here Thanks to Government Debt — And Bitcoin Will Benefit: Grayscale
The debasement trade is back — and will benefit bitcoin.
That’s according to asset manager Grayscale’s crypto research team, who wrote in a note this week that the U.S. government debasing its currency would lead to cash hitting digital assets.
“Unchecked government debt growth undermines the credibility of fiat currencies and drives investors to seek out alternative stores of value like physical gold and certain cryptocurrencies,” the note by the firm’s head of research, Zach Pandl, read, adding that primarily bitcoin would benefit.
The so-called debasement trade is when investors buy an asset as a way to hedge against a currency losing value. The trade was hot last year, and helped bitcoin’s run, but the digital asset’s run lost steam after October as traders turned their attention to stocks related to artificial intelligence.
But since last week, bitcoin has benefited from news that the U.S. Treasury would at least double the size of its liquidity-support buyback operations. The announcement last week hurt the dollar but non-yielding assets have benefited.
“That buybacks are needed at all is the problem: heavy growth in government debt is driving up the cost of borrowing,” the note continued. “The Treasury is treating the symptoms (rising bond yields) because they cannot cure the disease (structural deficits).”
The note added that on the same day last week as the buyback announcement, the Treasury also said the U.S. public debt exceeded $40 trillion for the first time.
As debt and interest payments grow, the government needs to either raise taxes, cut spending, or issue more debt.
Bitcoiners see the more politically likely path as expanding the dollar supply — which is ultimately bad for the dollar, and good for scarce assets like bitcoin.
After bitcoin started surging last week, the dollar had its worst week of August and was trading at a three-month low.
Bitcoin was trading for $77,493 on Friday afternoon in New York after hitting a high this week of $81,281. Over a 24-hour period, the coin now sits unmoved, but over a 30-day period, it has jumped by more than 20%.
This post Debasement Trade Is Here Thanks to Government Debt — And Bitcoin Will Benefit: Grayscale first appeared on Bitcoin Magazine and is written by Mathew Di Salvo.
Bitcoin Magazine

Bitcoin’s Moment Has Come for the Far East, Says Metaplanet CEO
Bitcoin’s time has come in Asia — especially with a changing regulatory landscape — and its people and companies should take advantage.
That was the message Metaplanet CEO Simon Gerovich gave at this year’s Bitcoin Asia conference, where on Friday he spoke of how his company went from failing to the third biggest bitcoin treasury in the world.
Bitcoin Asia kicked off on Thursday in Hong Kong, bringing the biggest names in the space to Hong Kong to talk about everything from treasury companies to building apps from scratch.
“The previous cycles belonged to the West, and the first Asian cycle has already started,” Gerovich said. “The only question left is who builds it. Will you?”
Often dubbed Asia’s answer to Nasdaq-listed Bitcoin treasury Strategy, Metaplanet pivoted from its core hotel and technology business to buying Bitcoin in 2024. The Tokyo Stock Exchange now holds 43,000 bitcoins worth about $3.3 billion at today’s prices.
Gerovich said in his speech that his company was small and going nowhere fast until it started putting bitcoin on its balance sheet, basically allowing investors to buy exposure to the biggest digital coin via its regulated shares.
He said that the strategy is a major opportunity for Asian companies, which can now capitalize on the changing regulatory landscape and the growing interest in Bitcoin.
Asian nations, including Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, are making regulatory changes to support digital assets.
Gerovich noted that Japan in particular is a country where its citizens have saved like no other part of the world — and that capital can now be put to good use.
“Hoarding cash has stopped making sense, and every household in Japan can now feel it,” he said.
“Japanese households hold roughly 14 trillion dollars in financial assets. About half of that sits in bank deposits, earning almost nothing, and that’s just Japan, add Korea, Southeast Asia, and the wealth managed out of this place, Hong Kong, and you’re looking at the deepest pools of patient savings on Earth.
“And for the first time in a generation, these savings are looking for somewhere to go.”
Gerovich added that Asian companies, institutions, and savers should take advantage of the current market conditions and build the Bitcoin infrastructure in their own regions.
“The end of the cash hoarding strategy and new rules are arriving at exactly the same time, and together, they set up what I think is the single biggest opportunity in Asian markets today,” he added.
This post Bitcoin’s Moment Has Come for the Far East, Says Metaplanet CEO first appeared on Bitcoin Magazine and is written by Mathew Di Salvo.
Bitcoin Magazine

Capital B Raises €21M From Adam Back and TOBAM To Buy More BTC
Capital B, the Euronext Growth-listed company that bills itself as Europe’s first bitcoin treasury company, has raised €21 million ($24 million) in a private placement backed by Blockstream’s Adam Back and asset manager TOBAM — money it says could buy 270 more bitcoin and push its stack to roughly 3,415 BTC.
The company said Friday that a total of 36,219,070 shares were sold at €0.58 each as part of the deal, a 6.45% discount to Wednesday’s closing price.
Capital B said the net proceeds are expected to reach about €19.9 million after fees and transaction costs.
Capital B is the 27th biggest publicly traded bitcoin treasury in the world, according to Bitcoin Treasuries, with a total of 3,145 bitcoins in its stash — worth $245 million at today’s bitcoin price of $77,960.
Capital B, which describes itself as Europe’s first bitcoin treasury, built much of that position through fundraising rounds during the first half of 2026.
In May, it acquired 192 coins for €13 million after completing three capital raises.
Capital B’s announcement as other treasuries look to raise funds and accelerate their buys. Just this week, NYSE-listed AI-powered education company Genius Group said it was aiming to build parallel AI and bitcoin treasuries worth a combined $1.6 billion, after the company sold its entire bitcoin reserves to repay $8.5 million in debt.
Bitcoin treasuries have faced headwinds since 2025 when the price of the leading cryptocurrency took a hit. A number of companies in the space have had to liquidate their holdings, including the biggest corporate holder of bitcoin, Nasdaq-listed Strategy.
This post Capital B Raises €21M From Adam Back and TOBAM To Buy More BTC first appeared on Bitcoin Magazine and is written by Mathew Di Salvo.
Bitcoin Magazine

Bitcoin Drops Before Shrugging Off Fed Chair’s Inflation Comments
Bitcoin dropped, then popped after Federal Reserve Chair Kevin Warsh gave his first major speech as head of the U.S. central bank and said he had “more work to do” to fight inflation.
The leading cryptocurrency was recently trading for $79,474 after dropping as low as $78,630 before quickly rising again.
Bitcoin has typically done well in a low interest rate environment but the Federal Reserve has been reluctant to lower borrowing costs due to sticky inflation in the world’s biggest economy.
“But on the price-stability side of our mandate, the numbers are more concerning,” Warsh said after talking about employment.
He added: “We must be confident that underlying inflation is moving to our objective, clearly and at sufficient speed. Otherwise, we have work to do.”
Bitcoin has in the past dropped on news that the Federal Reserve thinks inflation is too high because it means less chance of a rate cut. Following Warsh’s speech, traders priced in a 50% chance of rate hike in September.
But Bitcoin has appeared to — at least for now — shrug off the speech.
Bitcoin’s started surging last week after the U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced the department would double the size of its long-dated bond buybacks.
The news sent yields down lower, and the dollar slid while non-yielding assets like bitcoin and gold jumped.
Positive regulatory news also helped the coin: President Donald Trump last week said that the long-awaited crypto Clarity Act was a “very, very powerful” piece of legislation, and urged lawmakers to get it over the line.
The proposed law will establish a framework for distinguishing between digital assets that are securities, commodities or payment stablecoins — legislation that the crypto industry has long called for.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City is on Friday holding the annual event at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, where central bankers, Federal Reserve officials, policymakers and academics will gather to discuss “Financial Innovation: Implications for Payments and Policy.”
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City website, this year’s event will touch on how “recent years have seen a dramatic increase in innovation in financial intermediation and payments,” including new technologies such as “cryptocurrencies and stablecoins.”
This post Bitcoin Drops Before Shrugging Off Fed Chair’s Inflation Comments first appeared on Bitcoin Magazine and is written by Mathew Di Salvo.
Circle's wrapped Bitcoin product entered the market with unusually strong institutional credentials and almost no visible scale.
The company paired cirBTC with segregated reserves, a federally supervised custodian, direct minting and redemption for eligible businesses, and the distribution infrastructure behind USDC. Circle's Aug. 27 reserve panel nevertheless showed just 40.02450077 cirBTC outstanding about 11 weeks after its Ethereum launch.
The same panel showed 42.5114162 BTC in reserve, equal to about 106.2% coverage and a 2.48691543 BTC cushion across 14 disclosed Bitcoin addresses. The reserve cushion settled the backing question at that snapshot. The 40-token float exposed the harder problem: Circle had built a credible institutional wrapper but had barely begun to build a market around it.
That gap turns cirBTC into a test of a broader Circle thesis. Jeremy Allaire said in the company's second-quarter results that Circle had built “the platform for the internet financial system.” He was describing Circle's larger platform, including its trust charter, USDC and planned Arc network. cirBTC now has to show whether that infrastructure can produce the liquidity and integrations that make wrapped Bitcoin useful as collateral.
cirBTC is Circle's tokenized representation of Bitcoin on Ethereum. WBTC and Coinbase's cbBTC serve the same basic purpose, allowing Bitcoin value to move through smart-contract networks, but their scale makes the competitive gap stark.
| Token | Outstanding supply at check | Underlying BTC reserves | Scale versus cirBTC |
|---|---|---|---|
| cirBTC | 40.02450077 | 42.5114162 | 1x |
| WBTC | 116,499.2018 | 116,512.0029 | About 2,911x |
| cbBTC | 98,668.19 | 98,678.96 | About 2,465x |
The cirBTC figures are from Aug. 27. The WBTC transparency dashboard and Coinbase's cbBTC reserve page were checked Aug. 29, making this a close two-day comparison. Coinbase's total covered cbBTC across Ethereum, Base, Solana and Arbitrum and was counted once, avoiding double-counting of its multichain representations.

Supply is only one measure of a wrapped token's usefulness, but it is also evidence of distribution. Each token in circulation reflects demand to mint, acquire or deploy that representation of Bitcoin. The incumbents' six-figure supplies give venues and protocols far larger pools from which to build trading and lending markets.
Public activity data reinforced the scale difference. At the Aug. 29 check, DefiLlama showed about $110.49 million in 24-hour WBTC trading volume and $3.12 billion in maximum observed lending exposure. Its cbBTC page showed about $338.55 million of volume and $2.817 billion in maximum observed lending exposure. Those exposure figures describe DefiLlama's recorded maxima, rather than live lending balances or market share.
CoinGecko's verified cirBTC contract page showed no tracked 24-hour trading volume, liquidity or transactions. CoinGecko captures public tracked activity, leaving private, over-the-counter or untracked flows outside that observation. Its empty market fields still showed that cirBTC had yet to develop visible liquidity on a major public tracker.
A public Aave governance proposal sought to onboard cirBTC. The proposal status meant live collateral support, borrowing demand and risk parameters remained pending. For institutions, prospective support becomes useful only when positions can be opened, financed and unwound through functioning markets.
The adoption gap stands out because cirBTC arrived with a deliberately formal operating structure.
Circle's whitepaper identifies Circle International Bermuda Limited as the legal issuer. Circle National Trust holds the underlying Bitcoin as custodian, while Circle Internet Financial, LLC provides Circle Mint and related distribution services. The Ethereum token is an eight-decimal ERC-20 at 0x72DFB2E44f59C5AD2bAFE84314E5b99a7cd5075E, an identity also reflected on Etherscan.
Circle National Trust received final approval from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in July. The approval applied to the national trust bank, not to cirBTC as a separately approved financial product. It gave Circle a recognizable custody credential: underlying Bitcoin held by a federally chartered trust bank, paired with an issuer-operated transparency panel and direct conversion for qualified customers.
Circle Mint is designed for eligible institutions and is unavailable to individuals. Secondary-market users can transfer the ERC-20 token, while direct issuance and redemption depend on institutional eligibility, supported jurisdictions and Circle's compliance process.
That model may appeal to regulated funds and businesses that value a known redemption counterparty. It also creates a more selective path to primary-market access. WBTC and cbBTC already sit inside established exchange, wallet and lending networks. cirBTC needs dealers, market makers, protocols and custodial platforms to add another Bitcoin representation before its trust architecture can become useful collateral at scale.
Circle brings substantial distribution experience to that challenge. It reported $73.3 billion of USDC in circulation at the end of the second quarter and $14.8 trillion of USDC onchain transaction volume during the period. Those figures establish Circle's ability to operate a large token network. Demand for cirBTC will depend on whether venues and customers find comparable utility in its Bitcoin product.
Circle argues that wrapped Bitcoin should be “strategically neutral.” In its Aug. 11 thesis, the company focused on conflicts that can arise when a wrapped asset is controlled by an operator with its own centralized exchange, decentralized exchange or lending protocol. Under that definition, Circle can pursue broad distribution without steering users toward an affiliated trading or lending venue.
The operating structure defines neutrality as a commercial rather than structural condition. Circle-affiliated entities occupy each major point in cirBTC's design: issuance, custody, direct redemption and distribution. Circle also supplies USDC, the dollar liquidity that could pair with cirBTC, and is building Arc, a network that may become another venue for the token.
Circle can therefore claim commercial neutrality among third-party venues while retaining an integrated operating stack. Institutions may see that concentration as efficient accountability or as platform dependence. Adoption will decide which interpretation carries more weight.
The current numbers show that trust credentials have yet to overcome incumbent network effects. A reserve dashboard establishes backing. A collateral standard also needs broad acceptance, borrowing demand, deep trading and inexpensive redemption.
Arc could connect Circle's custody, stablecoin and wrapped Bitcoin products inside one settlement environment. Circle said the network's public mainnet was on track for Sept. 16, with more than 100 builders and a validator cohort that included major financial and payments companies.
The Aug. 29 reporting cutoff came before that scheduled launch. Circle's cirBTC documentation described Arc testnet support and broader Arc availability as forthcoming, leaving cirBTC's day-one public-mainnet availability unconfirmed.
Arc is therefore a future checkpoint rather than evidence of present distribution. Live cirBTC support, USDC markets, institutional participants and borrowing or trading integrations would shorten the route from minting to utility. Continued supply near 40 BTC after those rails arrive would make the gap between Circle's infrastructure and cirBTC adoption harder to explain as an early-launch condition.
For now, Circle's reserve panel supports two simultaneous conclusions. cirBTC was backed by more Bitcoin than Circle had issued, validating the disclosed reserve position at that moment. Relative to the dominant alternatives, almost nobody had minted it.
Circle has built the institutional plumbing. cirBTC still has to prove that users, venues and protocols want to connect to it.
The post CEO Jeremy Allaire says Circle built “the platform for the internet financial system”, but cirBTC has only 40 BTC appeared first on CryptoSlate.
Stablecoin demand is becoming consequential in the U.S. government debt market, but the maturity of that demand matters more than the headline total.
Washington now has two debt-market stories running at once. The federal framework for permitted payment stablecoins channels reserves into cash-like instruments and Treasuries with no more than 93 days remaining. Farther out on the curve, the Treasury Department said on Aug. 19 that it would at least double the maximum size of liquidity-support buybacks in the 10- to 20-year and 20- to 30-year nominal sectors beginning Sept. 9.
Together, those developments test a broad claim about digital dollars funding the United States. Stablecoin growth can reinforce demand for bills and overnight Treasury financing. Direct support for long-duration bonds remains outside the reserve mandate, while any connection to Bitcoin runs through wider financial conditions rather than a reserve trade.
The GENIUS Act requires permitted issuers to maintain identifiable reserves of at least one dollar for every payment stablecoin outstanding. Eligible assets include U.S. currency and Federal Reserve balances, withdrawable bank deposits, Treasuries with an original or remaining maturity of 93 days or less, qualifying overnight repo and reverse repo, government money-market funds invested in those instruments, regulator-approved similarly liquid federal assets, and qualifying tokenized versions.
The menu extends beyond Treasury bills, yet it remains built around liquidity and short duration. A newly issued 10-year note or 30-year bond falls outside the direct Treasury reserve category.
Implementation is still in progress. The law was enacted in July 2025, but its general effective date is the earlier of Jan. 18, 2027, or 120 days after final implementing rules. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued its framework as a proposal in February. On Aug. 19, the Comptroller said the final OCC rule was expected by November. Current issuer portfolios show how short-duration reserves work in practice; they do not establish that every issuer already operates under a completed federal regime.
| Claim | Relevant market segment | Primary evidence | What it supports | What it leaves unresolved |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GENIUS reserves favor cash-like assets | Cash, deposits, overnight repo and Treasuries at or below 93 days | Official statute | A direct front-end demand channel | Demand for 10- to 30-year bonds |
| Circle's reserves are short duration | Overnight Treasury repo, short Treasuries and bank cash | July USDC reserve report) | A large issuer already uses a cash-like mix | How much reserve growth is new Treasury demand |
| Treasury is expanding long-end buybacks | Off-the-run 10- to 30-year nominal coupons | Treasury announcement | More potential liquidity support for long bonds | A guaranteed purchase total or central-bank easing |
| Stablecoin flows move bill yields | Three-month Treasury bills | BIS working paper | A measurable front-end price effect | Reliable transmission to longer maturities or Bitcoin |
Circle provides a live example of short-duration reserve behavior rather than proof of systemwide demand. Its second-quarter filing put USDC circulation at $73.269 billion on June 30. A more detailed July assurance report) showed $71.826 billion in circulation and $71.904 billion of reserve assets on July 31.
Of that reserve, $60.717 billion sat in the Circle Reserve Fund, including $52.723 billion of overnight Treasury repo and $7.179 billion of Treasuries. Another $11.187 billion was held outside the fund, dominated by $10.607 billion of cash at regulated financial institutions. Every direct Treasury listed in the report matured by Sept. 22. The repo exposure involved lending cash against Treasury collateral. Both categories kept Circle's duration close to the front end of the market.
Those balances show the scale and boundary of the bid. Additional USDC can direct more cash toward bills, repo or bank deposits. The destination depends on the issuer's reserve allocation, and long coupons remain outside the direct channel.
The flow data add a second constraint: stablecoin market growth and fresh federal financing are different quantities. Circle customers minted $83.004 billion of USDC and redeemed $86.784 billion during the second quarter, leaving $3.780 billion of net redemptions. Quarter-end circulation was still 19% above a year earlier, but it stood about $2 billion below December. Gross issuance measures activity, and even net growth leaves the source of the dollars unknown.
The Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee, a private-sector group that advises Treasury on debt management, has drawn the same distinction. Stablecoin issuance could add short-maturity Treasury demand. Part of that effect may be displaced when users move balances out of bank deposits, money-market funds or other cash-like instruments that already finance bills. Demand from new offshore dollar users would be more additive, but the official evidence does not quantify that share.
Stablecoins can therefore change which balance sheet holds a bill without giving Treasury a wholly new lender for every dollar of token growth.
Treasury's planned operations target off-the-run nominal coupons in the 10- to 20-year and 20- to 30-year sectors. The department described the purpose as liquidity support: providing dealers and investors a predictable outlet for older securities that may trade less readily than the newest issue.
The tentative calendar lists seven affected long-end operations on Sept. 10, Sept. 24, Oct. 1, Oct. 8, Oct. 15, Oct. 27 and Nov. 4. Raising each maximum from $2 billion to at least $4 billion lifts aggregate capacity across those operations from $14 billion to at least $28 billion.
That figure is a ceiling. Treasury's buyback guidance sets the minimum for an operation at zero and allows the department to accept less than the maximum when offers are unattractive.
The program also differs from quantitative easing. Treasury retires the securities it accepts and finances buybacks like other outlays. All else equal, each dollar bought back requires another dollar of Treasury issuance. The department can choose the mix of bills and coupons used to meet its overall financing needs. Stablecoin demand could absorb part of the bill component if that mix leans toward the front end, but the government's borrowing requirement remains and stablecoin reserves never enter the long-bond buyback as direct purchasers.
Empirical work reinforces the maturity divide. A Bank for International Settlements working paper using data through March 2026 found that a $3.5 billion stablecoin inflow lowered three-month bill yields by 0.71 basis points on impact, about 4 basis points within 10 days and roughly 5 basis points at the estimated trough. The effect strengthened under some conditions of market stress and bill scarcity.
Longer maturities showed limited or no spillover in the same research. That pattern fits the assets issuers buy: cash placed into securities that mature within weeks can compress bill yields while leaving investors to bear the duration risk in 10-, 20- and 30-year debt.
The official yield curve offers current context rather than causal proof. On Aug. 28, Treasury data put the 10-year yield at 4.73%, the 20-year at 5.21% and the 30-year at 5.22%. Each maturity sits far beyond the GENIUS ceiling for direct Treasury reserve assets. The levels reflect many forces; they simply locate the part of the curve where a direct stablecoin bid is absent.
For Bitcoin, the defensible mechanism begins with broad financial conditions. Long-term Treasury yields can influence credit costs, the discount rates applied to risky assets and investors' appetite for volatile positions. Better trading conditions in older long bonds can improve market functioning, while a larger bill buyer base can support Treasury's front-end financing.
Those links create a possible macro channel, not a mechanical price signal. A stablecoin inflow may compress bill yields without lowering long-term yields. A Treasury buyback may improve liquidity without reducing net borrowing. Bitcoin can respond to changes in rates, dollar liquidity and risk appetite while moving for many unrelated reasons at the same time.
The evidence here provides no causal estimate connecting stablecoin flows, long-end buybacks or long yields to the price of Bitcoin. It therefore supports no fixed prediction for BTC from either stablecoin growth or the expanded buyback schedule.
The measurable conclusion is narrower. Stablecoins can become a larger source of demand for Washington's bills, especially when growth represents new dollar demand. The long-bond market still depends on investors willing to hold duration, leaving Treasury's liquidity operations and Bitcoin's financial-conditions channel separate from the regulated stablecoin reserve bid.
The post US treasury relies on stablecoins to fund short-term debt, but they can’t fix its $28B long-bond problem appeared first on CryptoSlate.
BitGo's NYDIG deal transfers its institutional trading business to the digital-asset custody and trading infrastructure provider, while NYDIG says it is concentrating resources on power, Bitcoin mining and high-performance-computing data centers.
The closing terms disclosed by BitGo put roughly $42.5 million of consideration upfront. BitGo is adding an institutional team, client relationships and financial products around its custody and settlement platform. NYDIG is directing attention toward a company-described power-and-compute footprint exceeding 3 GW.
The deal makes each company’s resource allocation clear while leaving the margin comparison unresolved. BitGo’s filings show that very large digital-asset sales can carry a thin gross spread. NYDIG describes a large infrastructure footprint without disclosing the returns attached to it. The useful comparison is between the proof points each side must deliver.

The merger agreement defines the acquired business as spot and derivatives trading, virtual-currency asset management, borrowing and lending, and loan servicing. It explicitly excludes NYDIG’s Bitcoin mining and custody businesses, keeping the power-and-compute footprint outside BitGo’s purchase.
Approximately 30 NYDIG employees and institutional client trading relationships joined BitGo, according to the deal announcement. The team adds derivatives, structured products, financing and capital-markets capabilities to a platform that already offers institutional custody, trading and settlement.
The upfront consideration consists of $7 million in cash, subject to holdback and adjustments, plus 5,933,577 BitGo shares. The agreement uses a $5.9829 reference price, which values those closing shares at about $35.5 million and brings the disclosed upfront amount to roughly $42.5 million before cash adjustments.
The seller can receive more. A first earn-out pays $10 million in cash. A second provides $5 million in cash plus 835,715 BitGo shares, worth roughly another $5 million at the agreement reference price. Separate awards targeting $10 million are intended for transferred employees rather than the seller, so they sit outside the seller’s purchase price.
Those earn-outs are tied to trailing-12-month revenue hurdles of $45 million and $70 million through February 2028. The thresholds create a visible growth test for the acquired business. Expenses tied to reaching either mark remain undisclosed, leaving profitability and any margin improvement for later results to establish.
| What is disclosed | What remains undisclosed |
|---|---|
| Roughly $42.5 million of upfront consideration before cash adjustments | The target’s historical revenue, direct costs and operating profit |
| $45 million and $70 million trailing-12-month revenue hurdles | The cost and margin attached to reaching either hurdle |
| The acquired services, approximately 30 employees and client relationships | The target’s asset contribution and integration costs |
| NYDIG’s claimed 3+ GW footprint and 2027-2028 delivery goal | How much capacity is operating, contracted or financed and at what return |
A revenue-based earn-out rewards scale more directly than efficiency. BitGo can meet its disclosed growth tests while still facing integration, compliance, technology and financing costs. Investors will need later filings to connect any acquired revenue to profit and to distinguish organic growth from activity transferred with the NYDIG client book.
BitGo’s second-quarter filing offers one reason the company may want more products around institutional trading. Its Digital Asset Sales line generated $4.197517 billion of revenue against $4.190435 billion of direct cost in the three months ended June 30. The $7.082 million difference equals about 16.9 basis points of that revenue line.
BitGo’s consolidated margin is a separate measure. The company says it presents most digital-asset sales on a gross basis because it acts as principal, which puts both the asset sale and the corresponding direct cost through revenue and expenses. The accounting produces billions of dollars of reported sales even when the difference between the two lines is comparatively small. BitGo separately recorded a $19.025 million consolidated net loss for the quarter.
The timing and scope prevent those figures from being assigned to the acquisition. The quarter ended before BitGo announced the completed transaction on Aug. 27. The public filings do not disclose the target unit’s historical revenue, profit, asset contribution or cost structure, and its derivatives, financing and lending activities may have a different revenue-recognition pattern from BitGo’s existing Digital Asset Sales line.
The 16.9-basis-point figure warns against equating gross transaction volume with durable economics. Target margins, acquisition accretion and any change in BitGo’s overall revenue mix require separate post-deal disclosures.
BitGo’s strategic case is that a broader set of trading, financing and structured products can deepen relationships across custody and settlement. The company described that as greater asset stickiness. The thesis becomes measurable when later disclosures show revenue contribution, integration costs and whether clients adopt several services without pushing risk or operating expenses up just as quickly.
Those disclosures will also need to separate the effects of the acquired client book from BitGo’s pre-existing trading activity. Higher revenue could otherwise reflect more gross principal volume rather than better pricing, higher-value services or improved profitability.
NYDIG’s Power & Compute page says the company owns generation assets, grid positions and data-center halls supporting high-performance computing, AI training and inference, and Bitcoin mining. It describes a North American footprint exceeding 3 GW.
The acquisition announcement says more than 1 GW is deliverable in 2027 and 2028. These are company statements about footprint, pipeline and timing. Current online capacity remains unspecified, along with contracted capacity, tenant revenue, construction cost, financing cost, utilization and project returns.
NYDIG’s direction predates the trading-unit sale. In March 2025, the company announced an agreement to acquire Crusoe’s Bitcoin mining business, subject to approvals, as part of an expansion in power and mining technology. The BitGo transaction sharpens an existing infrastructure priority rather than creating it from scratch.
The current transaction covers only institutional trading and related assets. Mining and custody are excluded from the agreement, supporting a shift in priority rather than a clean exit from every Bitcoin financial-infrastructure activity.
That leaves NYDIG with a different and more capital-intensive scorecard. It must turn claimed footprint into financed, contracted and operating capacity, then show what tenants pay, how fully facilities are used and what returns remain after construction and financing. A gigawatt figure indicates potential scale while leaving the cash flow from that scale unknown.
BitGo’s scorecard is closer to the income statement. The acquired unit must retain institutional relationships, reach the $45 million and $70 million revenue hurdles and turn a broader service stack into profit. Later filings can show whether those products deliver better economics than the company’s existing Digital Asset Sales activity.
The BitGo NYDIG deal identifies two bets and two pending scorecards. BitGo has disclosed the price and revenue tests for adding more financial services. NYDIG has disclosed the size of its infrastructure ambition and a delivery window. Target margins and NYDIG project returns will decide the durable-margin comparison as those figures become visible.
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PowerCompute, a Bitcoin treasury and mining company, added $3.765 million to its debt after an early Bitcoin collar reset involving 307 BTC. The executed schedule records the unwind cost as added principal rather than cash or USDC.
The company’s Aug. 28 filing disclosed a $21,892,131.88 replacement 30-day collar balance with Arch Lending, up from $18,127,131.88. The facility remains secured by 307 BTC, but its annual interest rate rose from 2% to 6.5%.
PowerCompute’s borrowing subsidiary, US Digital Mining and Hosting Co., elected to add the unwind cost to the balance. The annex says the cost was agreed in place of any separate excess-appreciation settlement for the terminated period.
The prior collar began Aug. 3 and was due to reset Sept. 2. PowerCompute ended it Aug. 25, 22 days into the period, at a $78,500 reference price. That was above its always-on $66,370 ceiling, as shown in the prior reset confirmation. The original loan filing carried the $18.13 million balance and 2% rate.
The replacement loan’s full Aug. 25 to Sept. 24 interest bill is $118,582.38 under the contract’s 30/360 calculation. The annex governs the collar’s 30-day mechanics, while its reset schedule supplies the commercial figures despite longer-form language in the master agreement.
The new collar moves the next decision to Sept. 24. It sets a $71,112 floor, a $75,000 ceiling and a $93,500 knock-in barrier. Arch will test the reference price once, at 8:00 a.m. EST.

Below $93,500, the ceiling has no effect. PowerCompute keeps all Bitcoin appreciation, even if the reference price is above $75,000. At or above $93,500, however, the ceiling applies to the whole period.
Only if the Sept. 24 reference price reaches at least $93,500 does excess appreciation arise. At the barrier exactly, the formula is:
307 × ($93,500 − $75,000) = $5,679,500
That is conditional settlement arithmetic before interest, not an amount already owed. PowerCompute can settle it through retained BTC or USD/USDC. If it rolls the loan, it can instead add the amount to principal or incorporate it into the next ceiling and rate quote.
The barrier is not an intraday liquidation line. The annex bars ordinary margin calls and liquidations during the rolling period, limits ordinary recourse to the pledged Bitcoin subject to stated carve-outs and tests the collar only at reset. A voluntary mid-period exit would bring the test forward.
At 2:23 a.m. UTC on Aug. 29, CryptoSlate’s live Bitcoin page displayed $77,808.23, putting the barrier about 20.2% above that snapshot. The comparison is context, not a Sept. 24 price forecast.
CryptoSlate covered the initial collar after tracking PowerCompute’s earlier bridge-loan chain. The Aug. 28 filing converts the first structure’s modeled trade-off into a realized financing cost and starts a new 30-day test.
The post One mid-tier Bitcoin treasury just gambled its entire BTC reserve on a single 30-day reset price appeared first on CryptoSlate.
OCEAN Mining has completed a buyout of co-founder and 16-year veteran Bitcoin Core developer Luke Dashjr, ending his ownership and three leadership roles at the Bitcoin mining pool.
Dashjr resigned as chairman, chief technology officer and director, while OCEAN repurchased all of his equity, according to an Aug. 29 joint statement. Holding those board, technical and executive positions had placed him at the center of both OCEAN's governance and its mining-policy decisions.
The private company did not disclose the repurchase price, its remaining ownership structure or successor appointments. OCEAN said it will continue operating its transparent, non-custodial pool, while Dashjr will pursue a new mining venture called CONVOY.
At the reporting cutoff, CONVOY had not published enough to verify an operating pool. Its public profile and the announcement disclosed no endpoint, codebase, participating miners, infrastructure, fees or block-template policy. They also disclosed no transfer of miners, staff other than Dashjr, or infrastructure from OCEAN.
A Mempool.space snapshot at 07:07 UTC on Aug. 30 attributed four of the previous 163 Bitcoin blocks to OCEAN, equal to 2.45%. Applying that share to the endpoint's network hashrate estimate produced a block-share-derived estimate of about 24.57 exahashes per second.
The longer window was similar. Mempool.space attributed 29 of 1,007 trailing-week blocks to OCEAN, or 2.88%, while its latest weekly hashrate row put the pool at 25.33 EH/s and 2.86% of the network.
Across both windows, OCEAN remained within a broad 2.5% to 3% band that makes miner departures measurable without turning a single block into a trend.
Those figures describe hashpower directed to OCEAN, not mining machines owned by the company. A trailing 24-hour window can also move quickly as blocks enter and leave the sample, making it a snapshot rather than durable market share.

The joint statement said the separation reflected different visions following recent protocol developments, but it did not name BIP-110, Bitcoin Knots, a proof-of-work change or another proposal as the cause.
OCEAN added dedicated BIP-110 and no-signal endpoints in July, then returned its default endpoint to the non-BIP-110 chain on Aug. 9 while keeping both choices live. OCEAN said its DATUM system let participating miners control block construction. CryptoSlate's earlier coverage detailed the surrounding fork and proof-of-work dispute, but the separation statement did not tie a specific development to the buyout.
A functioning CONVOY pool, published mining instructions or a sustained change in OCEAN's share would provide the first measurable evidence that miners and template policy are moving. The corporate split alone does not.
The post Veteran Bitcoin developer Luke Dashjr exits OCEAN pool – Will hash power follow him to new pool? appeared first on CryptoSlate.
If you are holding VANRY on KuCoin, a different deadline applies to you than the one the exchange gives you. What counts is September 10, 2026 at 13:00 UTC. By then your VANRY has to be sitting in your own wallet and swapped through the project's portal. KuCoin itself allows withdrawals until September 14, 2026 at 08:00 UTC, roughly four days longer. Anyone who goes by that later date will collect tokens for which no swap route exists any more by that point.
The reason is an announcement KuCoin published on August 13, 2026, which German-language coverage has so far passed over. The exchange has delisted the token and stated explicitly that it will not handle the swap for its customers. That puts the entire action on you. This piece explains what to do, in which order, and where the established facts end and the uncertainty begins.
In the delisting notice of August 13, 2026, KuCoin first describes the starting position: according to the Vanar Chain team the VANRY token is being migrated to the Base network, and KuCoin had worked with the project team on the terms of the token swap. Then comes the sentence that makes the difference. After several discussions, the project team had been unable to meet the conditions KuCoin requires in order to process a swap on behalf of users. The exchange draws the conclusion from this that it will not support the swap.
What matters is how you read that paragraph. It is the account of one of the two parties involved. KuCoin attributes the failed agreement to the project team; a public rebuttal from Vanar addressing this passage specifically is not available. For your decision the question of blame is secondary in any case. What is decisive is the practical consequence, and it is stated unambiguously in the same notice: VANRY deposits remain closed, withdrawals are possible via the Ethereum network as an ERC20 token, and users are strongly advised to withdraw their holdings as soon as possible.
That recommendation is right, but it is incomplete. Nowhere does the notice name a date by which the withdrawal has to be done for the swap to still work. That date sits with the project.
In the interplay between exchange and project there are three points in time. These three belong to different senders and mean different things.
August 14, 2026, 08:00 UTC. KuCoin removed VANRY from spot trading. Since then you can neither buy nor sell the token there. Deposits had already been closed beforehand and stay closed. This date has passed and matters only as context.
September 10, 2026, 13:00 UTC. The project's swap window closes. It was opened on August 11, 2026 at 13:00 UTC and runs for 30 days. The portal states unmistakably that there is only a single window and that no subsequent migration via the portal will be offered once the 30 days have elapsed. This is the deadline you have to orient yourself by.
September 14, 2026, 08:00 UTC. KuCoin closes the withdrawal service for VANRY. Up to that point you can get at your balance. After that, no longer by the normal route.
The last two dates lie roughly 91 hours apart, that is three days and 19 hours. During that period the withdrawal still works, but the swap does not.
Pairs of deadlines of this kind turn up regularly in delistings, and most of the time they are harmless. Here they are not, because the order is the wrong way round. The exit from the exchange stays open longer than the entrance to the swap. A customer who reads their exchange's announcement attentively and sticks to the date named there can do everything correctly and still end up with tokens that can no longer be migrated.
It is worth looking at Binance for comparison. There, five weeks lie between the end of the swap window and the end of the withdrawal deadline. A gap like that stands out; you can see that two different clocks are running. We have written up what that case looks like in detail in our piece on the VANRY migration to Base and the Binance withdrawal deadline. At KuCoin it is four days instead of five weeks, and the exchange urges customers in the same notice to withdraw. The gap is small enough to feel like a buffer, and large enough to become expensive.
In practice that means: count backwards from September 10, not forwards from today. And count with a buffer, because between clicking "withdraw" and the moment the tokens are available in your wallet, an exchange has verification steps, security checks and, if in doubt, a manual approval.

A token swap is the move of a token from one smart contract to another, as a rule because the project is changing blockchain. The old units are locked, and the same number of new units are created on the target network. With VANRY this happens at a ratio of one to one: for every old token locked you receive one new token on Base.
A centralized exchange can carry out this process for its customers because it holds the tokens in its own pooled wallets anyway. The trading venue locks the total holding, receives the new units and credits them back to the accounts. From your side it looks like nothing at all: the balance stays the same, trading carries on. It is precisely this convenience that falls away when an exchange declines the swap. Then you are the custodian yourself, and the action that would otherwise run in the background is one you have to trigger.
Self-custody is the technical term for holding your tokens in a wallet whose private key only you know. The project's swap portal can work exclusively with wallets of that kind, because it requires a signature from the address the tokens are sitting on. An exchange address cannot provide that signature for you.
The procedure consists of two operations that have to run one after the other. First the withdrawal from the exchange, then the swap in the portal. Both together have to be completed before September 10, 2026 at 13:00 UTC.
You need a wallet that supports the Ethereum network, because KuCoin pays VANRY out as an ERC20 token on Ethereum. Whether that is a software wallet on your phone or a hardware device makes no difference to the swap; what matters is that you control the private key and that the wallet can connect to a web application. If you are setting things up afresh at this point anyway, our hardware wallet comparison sets out the criteria that count here. Have the receiving address ready and check it twice.
For the withdrawal you select Ethereum, or ERC20, as the network. That is the only option KuCoin names for VANRY. Reckon with a network fee that the exchange deducts from the amount paid out, and with a processing time that, depending on load, can range from a few minutes to several hours. Small holdings can become uneconomic at this point if the fee eats up the value of the position. You should do that calculation beforehand.
As soon as the tokens have arrived in your wallet, you connect it to the swap portal, select Ethereum as the source chain, enter the amount, grant the approval and confirm the lock transaction. The new tokens are then sent automatically to the same address on Base. The portal gives around four hours after confirmation of the lock transaction as the figure from experience. There is no manual collection step.
One warning is stated so plainly in the portal that it belongs here again: never send tokens directly from an exchange into the swap. The detour via your own wallet is not a recommendation but a precondition, because the new tokens go to the sending address and you have no access to an exchange address.
On its portal page the project keeps a list of the trading venues that, by their own announcement, will process the swap. Six names are on it: Paribu, Bitvavo, LBank, Indodax, BingX and WEEX. For German investors Bitvavo is the one that matters most among them, because this provider serves the German-speaking market directly.
KuCoin is not on this list, and the exchange has since explained why itself. That answers a question that was still open in August: English-language reporting on August 10 had said that KuCoin would handle the migration automatically. That statement had no counterpart in the project's own list, and we flagged it at the time for what it was. The announcement of August 13 resolves the contradiction in the other direction.
A rule follows from this that holds beyond this case. What counts is always the announcement of your own trading venue, not a project's collected list, and certainly not a media report. If you spread your holdings across several venues anyway, a look at our overview of crypto exchanges compared helps you see which provider communicates how on delistings and migrations. VANRY was, incidentally, also one of six tokens that were dropped from spot trading at Binance in August; the list is in our piece on the Binance delisting of six tokens.
If your VANRY is in the project's staking rather than on an exchange, a second timetable applies. Staking means that you deposit tokens in a contract and receive a reward for it; the contract only releases them again after a lock-up period. This lock-up period, the so-called cooldown, is 21 days at Vanar.
According to the project, staking was closed on August 19, 2026; that was also the last day for which rewards accrue. Anyone who initiates unstaking by September 10, 2026 at the latest remains eligible for the swap, even if the 21 days have not elapsed by then. For these wallets an airdrop on Base is planned for September 11, 2026. Anyone who does not initiate unstaking by September 10 will, on the project's account, not be included in that airdrop.
In practice that means: the click on "unstake" is the actual cut-off, not the withdrawal itself. If you have not done anything here yet, that is the most urgent point on the whole list.

At this point precision matters more than drama, because a lot of half-knowledge is circulating here. The old tokens do not disappear on September 10, and nobody declares them worthless by decree. The project writes explicitly that it can neither block nor freeze, claw back or alter individual holders' balances. What ends is the swap route via the portal.
What the project goes on to write: after the migration the old contracts on Ethereum, Polygon and VanarChain are no longer to represent the active VANRY economy; the new token on Base becomes the definitive token for the coming phase. Full contract details and any final measures for the old contracts are to be published through the official channels. The project has not yet named a date for that.
That also leaves open whether there will be a case-by-case solution for latecomers after the deadline. The portal says neither yes nor no on this. Anyone who misses the swap should neither rely on goodwill nor assume it is ruled out. All that is established is that the route via the portal is closed at that point. More important than any speculation about it is the plain observation that liquidity follows the active token: the DEX liquidity on Ethereum was, according to the project, already removed on August 10, 2026.
Migrations attract imitators. As soon as a project announces a new contract, tokens with the same name and the same ticker appear that have nothing to do with the original. The only reliable test is the contract address, meaning the unique identifier of the smart contract on the chain in question.
For the old token on Ethereum and on Polygon the project names the same address, beginning with 0x8de5b80a. The new token on Base carries an address that begins with 0x07848a7b. On VanarChain itself there was no token contract, because VANRY was the native currency of that chain. Check the full address against the entry on the official portal page before every operation, and never take it from a message, a screenshot or a comment.
The portal itself warns with unusual clarity against using links from comments, direct messages, Telegram messages or unofficial websites. That warning is not there without reason: a deadline is the moment when attempted fraud works best, because time pressure crowds out checking.
The swap itself costs no fee according to the project; the ratio stays one to one. You still have to pay, in three places. First, the exchange's withdrawal fee. Second, the network fee for the approval and the lock transaction on Ethereum, which you bear yourself and which fluctuates with load. Third, if you want to move the new tokens on Base later, the network costs there, which are however markedly lower.
Keep a small amount of the relevant fee currency ready on the Base side, otherwise you will see your new tokens in the wallet but will not be able to move them. And build the four hours the portal gives as its experience figure for delivery into your schedule. Anyone starting around midday on September 10 no longer has that buffer.
How a one-to-one swap in the course of a network migration is to be treated for tax purposes depends on the individual case and is not something that can be answered across the board. What you can do in any event is make sure your records are complete. Note down when you originally acquired the tokens, when they left the exchange, when the lock transaction was confirmed and when the new units arrived on Base. Save the transaction identifiers for both chains.
The reason is pragmatic: a change of chain tears apart the automatic matching in many analysis tools. The old holding disappears, a new one turns up, and without your note that looks like a sale followed by a purchase. Our overview of tax tools and portfolio trackers shows how to represent operations like this cleanly. Classifying your specific case belongs in the hands of a tax adviser.
Honesty requires marking the edges. The dates, addresses and procedural details in this text come from two primary sources: KuCoin's delisting announcement and the project's swap portal. Both were retrievable on August 31, 2026. The two sides have opposing interests in how the failed swap agreement is presented, and neither of the two deadlines appears at the respective other party.
What we cannot establish is whether KuCoin will still change its position before September 14, whether the project will grant a grace period, and when the old contracts will be switched off. Nor do we make any statement about the token's price development; this text is a matter of deadlines and custody. And we do not judge who is in the right in the dispute between exchange and project team. Before every step, check the current announcement at KuCoin and the details in the official Vanar Chain swap portal.
(As of August 31, 2026. This article is not investment advice. Prices and fee structures change; check the terms with the provider before you buy.)
The Cronos blockchain has stopped. On Sunday, August 30, 2026, the chain's validators halted block production after an attacker had emptied the lending market Tectonic. Estimates of the damage range from roughly $66 million to $75 million, and a second on-chain analysis arrives at a considerably larger outflow from the lending pools. For you, a single distinction comes first: if your balance sits on the chain itself, it is not moving right now, whether or not you ever had anything to do with Tectonic. If it sits in the Crypto.com app or on the company's exchange, it is untouched, according to the company.
Tectonic is the largest lending protocol on Cronos. A lending protocol is an application into which users deposit funds so that other users can borrow them against posted collateral; the depositors earn interest in return. Before the attack it held roughly $121.7 million, according to Blockonomi, which amounted to about 46 percent of all capital deposited in Cronos DeFi. Outstanding loans at that point stood at roughly $82.7 million.
The attacker drove up the price of TONIC, the protocol's own governance token, posted the revalued holding as collateral and borrowed the hard assets out of the pools against it. He then began to move the proceeds out across a bridge. A bridge is a service that transfers value from one blockchain to another; it is the only way to get proceeds off a chain.
That is exactly where the validators stepped in. The Cronos account wrote on X the same day: "We identified an exploit in Tectonic. The Cronos Network has been halted and we'll provide updates here." Tectonic itself reported shortly afterwards that it was dealing with an incident, and asked users to leave the protocol alone for the time being: "As a precaution, please do not interact with the protocol until we confirm it is safe to do so."
The price of CRO, the chain's base asset, incidentally did not give way that day. Blockonomi reports a gain of around five percent over the course of the day. That is an indication of how little a chain halt can be read off the market price in the first moment.
The numbers that explain the attack are not in the damage report but in the market data of the manipulated token. TONIC had trading liquidity of roughly $1.34 million and a daily volume of about $11,000, according to Blockonomi. A token with that volume can be pushed in any direction with comparatively little capital.
According to the analysis by on-chain analyst Weilin Li, which several trade publications rely on, the TONIC price rose roughly a hundredfold in about 20 minutes. The attacker then posted that holding as collateral and withdrew from the pools the assets that were actually worth something. Blockonomi puts the window between the start of the manipulation and the end of the withdrawals at around 65 minutes.
The procedure has a name, and it is an old one. An attacker inflates the price of a thinly traded piece of collateral, borrows real assets against it and leaves the worthless position standing. Anyone who knows the Moonwell case on Base will recognize the pattern immediately: there too, barely traded collateral was the way in, as our analysis of the Moonwell exploit of August 27 shows.
No key was stolen and no security flaw in the program code was exploited. The contracts did what they were supposed to do. What was wrong was the assumption they operated on: that the reported price of a piece of collateral matches what it actually sells for. That is a valuation question, not a key question, and that is why no hardware wallet protects you here.
Every lending protocol sets a loan-to-value ratio for each piece of approved collateral. The loan-to-value ratio states what share of the deposited value you are actually allowed to borrow; at 20 percent, $1,000 of collateral gives you $200 of credit. For TONIC that value stood at 20 percent, according to Blockonomi.
A low ratio sounds cautious, and it is, as long as the underlying price holds. Against a manipulated price, however, the ratio no longer helps at all. Twenty percent of a value inflated a hundredfold is still a multiple of what the collateral really yields. The ratio caps the leverage, not the error.
Anyone who wants to see how differently providers handle exactly this question will find the range of approved collateral and terms in our comparison of crypto lending providers. The gap between a protocol that admits only a few deeply traded assets and one that accepts its own governance token as collateral is considerable.

Several amounts are in circulation, and they contradict each other only in appearance. Weilin Li's first estimate came to roughly $66 million and was raised to about $75 million after a further attacker address holding roughly $8 million could be attributed. That figure appears in most of the day's reports, among them The Block.
A second analysis, which Cryptobriefing attributes to on-chain analyst Awoo, arrives at an outflow of roughly $120 million from the pools in a single transaction, plus around $2 million through copycats and a stake of about $5.6 million from the attacker. Other houses name $119.5 million as the amount that was at risk.
The two figures measure different things. One describes what was left as proceeds at the end, the other what was moved out of the pools in total. Tectonic itself had confirmed neither a sum nor a cause by press time. As long as that is the case, the range belongs in every account, and not a smoothed average.
That a blockchain can be halted within minutes is not a matter of course but a property of how it is built. Cronos runs on Tendermint Core, a consensus mechanism in which a fixed, permissioned group of validators produces the blocks. The number of these validators is capped at 100.
A validator is a machine that proposes and confirms new blocks. With a hundred known operators, an agreement can be organized within a few minutes. With a chain of hundreds of thousands of independent participants it cannot be, and that is precisely why Bitcoin cannot be halted and Cronos can. That is neither a flaw nor a merit but a trade-off: speed and the ability to act, in exchange for unstoppability.
The case of August 30 is not the first of its kind this month. Only the day before, three chains from the Cosmos ecosystem pulled the emergency brake for a different reason, as set out in our analysis of the Cosmos EVM vulnerability. The chain halt has thus been used as a tool twice within two days.
The arithmetic of the day is unusually clear. Before block production ended, the attacker had moved roughly $6 million across a bridge to Ethereum, according to consistent reports. Around $60 million stayed behind on the stalled chain and is as unreachable there for the attacker as it is for everyone else.
The halt has thereby held on to the greater part of the proceeds. But it has also frozen every other position on Cronos along with it: every open loan, every trading position, every scheduled payout, every automated process. A user who wanted to sell on Sunday afternoon and had nothing to do with the incident could not.
Neither Cronos nor Tectonic had published a restart date or a final post-mortem by press time. A post-mortem is a project's retrospective report on the course, cause and consequences of an incident. Nor had any party committed by then to compensating Tectonic's depositors.
Cronos is often mentioned in the same breath as Crypto.com, and for placing your own situation it is precisely that closeness that produces the most common mix-up. Crypto.com chief executive Kris Marszalek stated on X on August 30 that the company's app and exchange had not been compromised, that customer funds there were safe, and that its own security team was supporting the investigation. He promised a full post-mortem once the investigation is complete.
In practice that means: anyone holding CRO through the app or the exchange holds an entry in a company's database and is not affected by the state of the chain for now. Anyone running their own wallet on Cronos, by contrast, holds their assets on exactly the chain that has stopped. The same coin, two entirely different situations.
That distinction is the core of the case for you, and it has a flip side. A balance held with a provider is insensitive to a chain halt, but dependent on the provider. A balance in your own wallet is independent of the provider, but tied to the fate of the chain. You do not get both at once.

A halted network behaves differently from what most people expect. Your assets have not disappeared, the last valid balance is fixed, and it stands. What is missing is the ability to change it. There is no transfer, no sale, no repayment and no margin top-up as long as no block is being produced.
Three things follow from this that can affect you directly. A loan that stood just short of the liquidation threshold cannot be rescued by a top-up during the standstill. A price you saw on an external market can no longer be realized on the chain. And an application that depends on data from this chain carries on working with a frozen state, even if it runs on a different network itself.
At the restart a further question arises that is still open in the Cronos case: what happens to the attacker's balances that sit on the chain? A chain that can be halted can also alter states at the restart. Whether that happens here has not been announced so far.
What counts for you in this case is above all a question that goes beyond Cronos: how much of your own holdings sits on networks that can be halted by agreement? That is not a matter of guesswork but a property you can look up, and you need no technical knowledge for it.
The block explorer of the chain in question, meaning the public search interface for blocks and transactions, usually carries a validator list. Four data points are enough for an assessment: the number of active validators, whether access is open or permissioned, how much share the largest operators hold between them, and whether the chain has ever been halted before. A double-digit or barely triple-digit validator count with permissioned access means, in practice: this chain can be halted.
No instruction to sell follows from that. What follows is that you know which part of your holdings can become immobile in an emergency, and that you choose that part deliberately rather than by accident.
When you put funds into a lending protocol, you are on the hook for the quality of the collateral that protocol admits, even if you hold none of it yourself. If the proceeds from a piece of collateral are not enough after a collapse to cover the loan, an uncollectible residual claim stays in the system, and that comes at the depositors' expense.
Three data points appear in almost every protocol's documentation and largely answer the question. First, the list of approved collateral together with the loan-to-value ratio: if the protocol's own governance token is on it, that is a warning sign, because its price moves with the protocol's fortunes. Second, the price source: a price that comes from a single thin trading venue is easier to move than a value averaged over time from several sources. Third, the separation of markets: some protocols isolate risky collateral in pots of their own, so that a failure there does not feed through to the remaining depositors.
The case is part of a run that has been going on for weeks. On August 23 it hit Term Finance through voting rights, on August 27 Moonwell through the price source of a thinly traded piece of collateral, on August 30 Tectonic by the same route. The attacks differ in detail but always hit the same spot: the valuation of what is posted as collateral.
A chain halt creates a gap in your records, and that gap catches up with you later, not today. As long as no blocks are being produced, the chain supplies no new data, and portfolio and tax programs that draw their values from there show a frozen state or none at all.
So write down now what cannot be reconstructed later: the time of the halt as you observed it, your positions and open loans as of the last valid block, all project announcements with their dates, and every operation you could not carry out because of the standstill. If compensation follows later, or something is changed at the restart, you will need this starting state to explain the difference.
A note for context, not tax advice: whether a loss from an incident of this kind is recognized for tax purposes, and under which type of income, has to be assessed case by case and belongs in the hands of a tax adviser. What you can contribute is a complete set of records.
Further reading: the write-up by TFTC on the chain halt and Tectonic's share of Cronos DeFi liquidity and the compilation by Blockonomi on the loan-to-value ratio, trading volume and time window of the attack.
(As of August 30, 2026. This article is not investment advice. Prices and fee structures change; check the terms with the provider before you buy.)
When you pay with a crypto card, the money backing that card frequently does not sit in your own wallet. It sits in a separate container operated by the card platform and filled by you when you top up. On August 28, 2026 an attack on exactly such a container showed what that means when things go wrong: users' self-custodied wallets were left untouched, and the loaded card balance was gone.
The provider concerned is not available in Germany. The construction behind it, however, is. This piece places the incident in context, explains the terms and shows you how to tell which custody model your own card uses and who would be responsible in the event of a loss.
Avici is a so-called neobank on the Solana blockchain: an app that attaches a Visa card to an on-chain account of its own. On August 28, 2026 the provider disclosed that there was a problem with card payouts. According to the reconstruction by crypto.news, the first malicious transaction occurred at 16:49:48 UTC, and reporting began in the early evening.
On the provider's account, what was affected was neither the Solana network nor the users' app wallet, but a single smart contract in which the backing for the cards is held. Anyone who left their funds in the app without loading them onto the card stood outside the attack. Anyone who had topped up stood inside it.
On the account given by Cryptopolitan, the attacker exploited the payout logic of the program written in Rust by calling the functions SubmitSignatures, AddCollateralAdmin and WithdrawCollateralAsset one after another. The middle step is the decisive one: with it the attacker entered himself as an authorised administrator of the collateral and could then withdraw what had been deposited through the regular route.
The episode was not a single grab. According to the breakdown Avici published later, the attack series comprised 14,672 transactions, of which 2,344 failed. That points to an automated script working through the contract systematically over hours rather than to a one-off strike.
A card balance contract is a standalone program on a blockchain into which you transfer funds so that a payment card can draw on them. As soon as you top up, the money leaves your wallet and sits in that contract until a card payment is settled or you pull it back.
The difference from a wallet is practical rather than theoretical. Your wallet is protected by a key only you hold. The card contract has an access logic of its own, usually with roles for the operator so that settlement works at all. Whoever defeats that role management reaches the balances of every user without knowing a single private key.
That is exactly what happened at Avici. The app's self-custodied Solana and EVM wallets were left untouched according to the provider. What was attacked was solely the separate contract into which users had transferred funds for the card. The widespread notion that a self-custodial product is automatically self-custodial as a whole does not hold at this point.
Two orders of magnitude are circulating about the scale, and both rest on a traceable basis. On the day of the incident crypto.news counted an outflow of 10,005.03 SOL plus around $11,600 in USDC and USDT, together roughly $1.07 million at the price of the time. Avici itself named 1,685 affected users and $500,859.22 in card balances after its internal reconciliation.
The range of roughly $0.5 million to $1.07 million resolves once you look at the reference quantity. The higher figure measures what flowed out of the contract in assets. The lower one measures how much of that could be assigned to individual customer accounts as card balance. Both figures come from different ways of counting, and neither is the "correct" one in the sense of the other.
For you as a reader the lesson matters more than the exact sum: in the first hours of an incident like this, on-chain estimates and the provider's later reconciliation stand side by side, and they rarely coincide. Anyone making decisions in that phase should know which of the two figures they are looking at.

The name on the card is the app's. Issuing and technical operation are as a rule handled by a specialised card issuer in the background. At Avici that is the firm Rain, which supplies card programmes for companies and maintains contracts of its own on several blockchains for the purpose.
According to the companies involved, Rain located the fault itself and traced it to an outdated version of its Solana contracts, used besides Avici by a small number of other programmes. The company says all deployments still running on that version were subsequently updated and external forensic specialists brought in. Which other programmes were affected, and whether damage arose there, has not been named publicly.
Avici has undertaken to reimburse all affected card balances in full and says it has filed a report with the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center. Whether and when reimbursements have actually been made cannot be verified from outside; the undertaking is an announcement by the company rather than an accomplished fact.
On the same day the card programme of the Solana trading platform Jupiter also briefly paused payouts of card balances. The platform explained this as a precautionary measure while its card partner completed security checks of its own, and stated that its own users' accounts and funds had at no point been affected. Payouts then resumed as normal.
This episode is more instructive than it first appears. The brief halt shows that a fault in a shared contract version reaches several card programmes at once, including ones from which nothing ultimately flows out. The card in your hand can come from a provider whose software you never chose.
Such a halt amounts in effect to a temporary block on your card balance. The money is not lost, but it is unavailable for the duration of the check. Anyone parking a whole month's spending on a crypto card notices the difference from a current account in exactly this situation.
For German readers the availability question is the first filter, and it comes out clearly for the two programmes named. Avici's documentation lists 47 territories in which the card can be used, among them countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia and individual US states. Europe, the European Economic Area and Germany appear in neither the permitted nor the prohibited list. The Jupiter card, issued by Rain or by DCS depending on country of residence, likewise does not list the EEA among its supported regions.
The model itself is nevertheless available in Germany. The card from ether.fi, for instance, is also issued through Rain, holds the balance in a smart contract vault controlled by the user, and settles on the Ethereum layer 2 Scroll. The provider's help page lists twenty unsupported countries, among them Estonia, Finland, the Netherlands and Hungary; Germany is not on it. Because this programme does not settle on Solana, it falls outside the contract version at issue in the Avici case.
Anyone looking around this product group finds cards with quite different mechanics side by side. Which models exist and how fees and cashback differ is set out in the overview of crypto credit cards. The custody question is only one of several there, but it is the one that decides responsibility when something goes wrong.
In the EU a payment card with a loaded balance is normally an e-money product. The issuer needs authorisation as an e-money institution for it, must separate customer funds from its own assets and hold them at a bank or in safe investments. Where crypto enters the picture, authorisation as a crypto-asset service provider has been added since the MiCA transition period ended on July 1, 2026.
The difference from deposit protection matters: segregated custody means that customer funds do not fall into the estate if the provider becomes insolvent. It does not mean that a state guarantee scheme steps in for losses, as it does for bank deposits up to 100,000 euros. Advertising for payment cards regularly conflates the two.
If your card balance sits in an on-chain contract instead, this framework does not apply in that form. There is then no custodied customer money at an institution, but assets in a program whose security depends on the code and on its role management. Reimbursement in that case is a matter of goodwill and of the provider's contractual undertaking, as the Avici case shows, and not a matter of supervisory law.

Under the first model you top up a card, your crypto is sold either at top-up or at payment, and what sits on the card is electronic money at a licensed issuer. The provider keeps an account for you, the supervisor watches over the separation of customer funds, and in a dispute you have a named contractual partner holding authorisation.
Under the second model you transfer crypto into a contract that serves as collateral or as the balance for the card. The appeal lies in keeping control for longer and not having to sell assets in order to be able to pay. The price lies in the security of that contract becoming your risk, regardless of how well you look after your own keys.
Hybrid forms exist. Some providers hold the balance in fiat at an institution and additionally let you post crypto as collateral. Others convert only at the moment of payment. Which variant applies is stated in the terms, and reading those repays the effort more than the product description on the home page.
Regardless of the custody model, paying with crypto in Germany has a tax dimension that many discover only at the tax return. If crypto is exchanged into euros at the card payment or at top-up, that is a disposal in the sense of private assets. Whether a taxable gain results depends on the holding period, the acquisition costs and the exemption threshold.
In practice that means a card converting a small amount at every purchase generates many individual events that want documenting. Anyone not recording them continuously faces a reconstruction from bank statements and blockchain data at the end of the year. Models in which you pay against posted collateral instead of selling behave differently for tax purposes; here an assessment of the individual case repays the effort, because it turns on the specific contractual arrangement.
You answer the following questions for your own card from the provider's documents rather than from memory.
First: who issues the card? The terms name an institution with a registered office and an authorisation. If an EEA e-money institution is named there, that points to the first model. If an infrastructure provider without any stated authorisation is named, read on.
Second: what happens when you top up? If your crypto is converted into euros or dollars and carried as a balance, e-money is involved. If it stays as crypto and is described as collateral, you are working with an on-chain contract.
Third: do the terms name a contract with an address? Providers of the second model give the contract address or a vault. That is a reliable identifying mark.
Fourth: how is reimbursement handled when things go wrong? Search the terms for the words liability, reimbursement and exclusion. A provider expressly excluding losses from faults in smart contracts is telling you where your risk lies.
Fifth: how much is on the card at all? A card balance is cash in your jacket pocket and not a portfolio. Loading only the next few weeks' needs limits the possible damage to an amount you can absorb.
If this check brings you up against approvals and signatures you are asked to confirm, read carefully first what you are approving. How to recognise an abusive approval is set out at length in our guide to wallet drainers and signature approvals.
The August 28 incident does not concern you directly as a German card user, because the two programmes named are not available here. The construction that made the damage possible in the first place, however, is also found in cards you can obtain in this country. Three steps take you further:
(As of August 30, 2026. This article is not investment advice. Prices and fee structures change; check the terms with the provider before you buy.)
On August 27, 2026 an attacker pulled roughly $8.7 million out of the Moonwell lending protocol on the Ethereum layer Base without breaking a single line of program code. He pushed up the price of a thinly traded token and posted that inflated holding as collateral for loans. If you have funds sitting in a DeFi lending market, the most important question raised by this case is this: which collateral does your own market accept, and who sets its price?
Moonwell is a lending protocol, an application into which users deposit crypto assets so that other users can borrow against collateral of their own. It runs on Base, the Ethereum layer 2 operated by Coinbase, and ranks there among the larger addresses for interest-bearing deposits.
The protocol's post-mortem dates the attack sequence to August 27, 2026 between 06:09:45 and 09:30:13 UTC. Within those three hours and change the attacker borrowed assets with a gross value of $11,028,762 from four markets, according to the report. The security firms PeckShield and CertiK put the damage at around $8.7 million the same day; Blockaid initially identified 50.6 cbBTC worth more than $4 million flowing out of a single market. The spread between these figures is explained by the cut-off point: the gross amount describes what was borrowed, the lower figures describe what was actually missing after the liquidations.
The following day Moonwell put the remaining borrower obligations from the MAMO market at roughly $9.131 million. That is the sum standing open in the protocol for which there is no longer any solvent debtor.
An oracle is a protocol's price source: the mechanism through which a contract on the blockchain learns what a token is currently worth. Without an oracle a lending market cannot calculate how much a posted collateral covers.
That is exactly where the attack applied its lever. According to the post-mortem, the price of the MAMO token rose from about $0.010597 to a peak of $0.43127363, roughly fortyfold. The highest price Moonwell accepted as valid stood at $0.40248571. MAMO is the token of an AI-assisted finance app on Base and is thinly traded. That means there are few buy and sell orders in the market, and even a medium-sized purchase moves the price appreciably.
Whoever can move such a price also moves the calculation base of the lending market. A holding with a real market value in the low six figures became, in the protocol's bookkeeping, collateral worth millions. The rest was ordinary protocol usage: post collateral, draw a loan, do not repay it.
Moonwell's contracts did what they were written to do. There was no overflowing memory, no forgotten permission check, no injected foreign code. The weakness lay in an assumption: that the observed market price of a token adequately describes its value as collateral. On a widely traded asset that assumption holds. On a thinly traded token it does not.
The borrowing was not done in MAMO but in assets that can be sold immediately. The post-mortem names four markets: cbBTC, WETH, USDC and wstETH. cbBTC is Coinbase Wrapped Bitcoin, a claim on deposited bitcoin that trades on Base. WETH is the tradable contract form of ether, wstETH an interest-bearing variant of it, and USDC a stablecoin pegged to the dollar.
These four markets were not themselves attacked. They were where the inflated collateral was paid out from. According to several reports the attacker then swapped the proceeds into DAI and consolidated them in one address. The price of the two protocol-adjacent tokens gave way over the first 24 hours: on data from CoinGecko and DEX Screener, WELL lost around 13 percent and MAMO about 9 percent.
The timing the protocol itself documents is worth noting: the liquidations kicked in 32 seconds after the last successful loan. The automatic mechanism meant to unwind exactly such positions did work. It simply arrived at a moment when the posted collateral had already lost its price again.

A borrow cap is the ceiling on how much may be borrowed from a market in total. A supply cap correspondingly limits how much can be deposited. Both values are parameters that a protocol governance can change at any time.
At 10:53:43 UTC an emergency transaction lowered the borrow caps of every core market on Base to 1 wei. Wei is the smallest unit of ether, one quintillionth; a ceiling of that size means in practice that nobody can borrow anything any more. At 11:09:43 UTC the supply cap for MAMO followed, and the cap for the protocol token WELL was set to the same value.
For you as a depositor that carries two practical consequences. New loans are ruled out, so the hole cannot keep growing. Whether you can withdraw your deposit, by contrast, depends on the utilisation of the market in question: a lending market can only ever pay out as much as is not currently lent.
Bad debt in a lending protocol denotes the portion of outstanding loans no longer matched by realisable collateral. It arises when a position loses value faster than liquidation can unwind it, or when the collateral was valued too highly from the outset.
The roughly $9.131 million in open obligations from the MAMO market is precisely that. Here lies the point that makes this case interesting beyond Moonwell: the shortfall is borne by the depositors of the four plundered markets. Anyone who supplied cbBTC, WETH, USDC or wstETH in order to earn interest never touched MAMO and is nevertheless caught in the default, unless the protocol makes it good from its own funds.
There was no pledge of compensation at the time of reporting; Moonwell stated merely that the investigation was continuing. It is therefore open whether the shortfall will be covered from a reserve, from the foundation treasury, or not at all. That uncertainty is exactly why a yield in a lending protocol is not an interest payment in the sense of a bank account. If you want to weigh such default risks against the models of more closely supervised providers, a look at our comparison of the best staking and yield platforms helps, since it sets the models and their safeguards side by side.
Lending protocols organise their markets in two ways. In a core market several assets share a common pot: one collateral can be borrowed against any other asset in that pot. In an isolated market every pair of collateral and borrowed asset is walled off, so that a default stays confined to that single pair.
In the Moonwell incident MAMO belonged to the core markets on Base. That is why collateral consisting of a token with low trading volume could draw out genuine bitcoin and ether holdings, and why the emergency brake then had to cover every core market on the chain rather than only the affected one.
The lesson for you is uncomfortably simple: in a common pot your risk is never smaller than the risk of the weakest collateral admitted there. Anyone supplying USDC while assuming they carry only stablecoin risk has not examined how the market is built.

The August incident does not stand alone. In February 2026 a faulty price calculation valued Coinbase Wrapped Ether at around $1.12 instead of roughly $2,200 and left $1.78 million of bad debt according to reports. March 2026 brought a governance attack in which a stake of about $1,800 in MFAM tokens threatened assets worth around $1.08 million.
How many incidents that adds up to depends on the counting. The trade outlet Techtimes speaks of the third disruption in eleven months, Protos of four incidents in a year. What both counts have in common is that the price source stood at the centre twice and the distribution of voting rights once. For your assessment the exact number matters less than the pattern behind it.
Comparable cases have been piling up for weeks. At Ostium on Arbitrum the price source was likewise the way in, and at Ajna v2 around $775,400 drained out through the liquidation calculation in late August, there without any oracle at all. What links these cases is the valuation of thin markets inside contracts that nobody can subsequently halt.
The case is useful to you above all because its cause can be looked up in any other lending protocol. All of the details below are publicly available in the documentation or in the interface of the protocol concerned.
This check costs you half an hour per protocol, once. It replaces no guarantee, but it separates the markets whose risk you know from those whose risk you merely hope about.
A spot oracle reads the price applying at a trading venue in that very moment. A TWAP oracle, short for time-weighted average price, instead forms an average over a time window and thereby renders a brief price spike largely ineffective.
The practical difference shows up in precisely a case like this one. Whoever can drive a price fortyfold for a few minutes immediately gains creditworthiness against a spot price. Against an average over thirty minutes he would have to hold the price up for half an hour, which is incomparably more expensive and frequently makes the attack unprofitable.
In a protocol's documentation you will usually find this detail under oracles, price feeds or risk parameters. If an established price provider with several sources is named there, that is a good sign. If the reference is to a single liquidity pool, you already know the attack path.
For as long as a crypto asset is working inside a lending protocol, you carry that protocol's contract and valuation risk. A holding you do not lend out carries none of it. That is why the split between yield-bearing and dormant holdings deserves a decision of its own rather than being made in passing. Which devices come into question for the dormant part is shown by our hardware wallet comparison.
If you are affected by the incident, secure the evidence now. Note the time, the amounts and the transaction hashes of your deposits and withdrawals while the episode is fresh. Reconstructing events later, when the interface may no longer exist, is considerably more laborious.
For further reading: the post-mortem in the Moonwell governance forum of August 28, 2026 with the full timeline, along with the assessments of the security firms at crypto.news.
(As of August 30, 2026. This article is not investment advice. Prices and fee structures change; check the terms with the provider before you buy.)
If you run your own Lightning node on the Core Lightning software, exactly one task is due today: the update to version 26.06.7. Blockstream says it shipped this release on August 28, 2026. It closes several confirmed security vulnerabilities, and every older release has counted as unsupported since then. If you cannot update straight away, restart the node with the --offline switch instead. Either takes a few minutes, and either is more effective than the reaction most people reach for first: switching the machine off.
If you hold Bitcoin on an exchange, in an ordinary wallet or in an app without running a node yourself, the warning does not concern you directly. What is meant is the machine that manages your payment channels. Anyone who runs none has nothing to update. It is still worth a look: the episode shows how quickly a reported programming error turns into a deadline with a date, and it is repeating itself at short intervals right now.
Core Lightning, CLN for short, is one of several software implementations of the Lightning network. The Lightning network is a second layer above the Bitcoin blockchain: two parties jointly lock an amount in a transaction and then settle between themselves as often as they like, without writing each payment into the blockchain individually. That locked connection is called a payment channel. The software that manages such a channel, monitors it and defends it in a dispute is called a node.
In late August the CLN team reported publicly that it had spent weeks working through an unusually high number of vulnerability reports generated with the help of AI tools. Several of them turned out to be genuine. The project's instruction on its own channel was terse and ran counter to first instinct: on no account shut the node down, restart it with --offline instead, because that switch blocks connections to other nodes and thereby closes the attack path.
Accounts of the exact sequence diverge, and that is worth mentioning, because the assessment of how long the holes stood open hangs on it. The trade outlet CryptoSlate dates the arrival of the first AI-generated reports to August 13 and an initial announcement by the project to August 23. Other reports, among them the one by TFTC, put the public warning at August 26 and speak of roughly ten days of lead time. The end of that chain is documented and undisputed: on August 28 the repaired release was available as a signed program file.
According to the state of reporting at the time of disclosure, there were no confirmed losses of funds and no known case in which anyone actually exploited one of the holes. That is a snapshot rather than an all-clear: the technical core of the flaws stays under wraps until mid-September, and only after that can anyone check independently how large the window really was.
The warning applies to the Core Lightning software. Other implementations of the Lightning network are not named in the project's notice. For you the question can be answered along a simple line:
--offline, today.This distinction matters more than it sounds. Warnings of this kind are quickly shortened into reports about the entire Lightning network. The circle of addressees is narrower: it covers the operators of one particular piece of software in one particular release.
The repaired release carries the number 26.06.7. The project's note on it is short and hard: releases before 26.06.7 are no longer supported. That does not mean an older node comes to a halt, because technically it keeps running. It means no more security repairs will arrive for those builds and that a known attack path stays open once the source code is published.
Precision pays off on the date, because the figures diverge slightly: Blockstream's blog entry is dated August 28, 2026, while in the Umbrel app store the same release carries August 29. The difference comes from the route through the package sources and changes nothing about the substance. What matters is the number, not the day.
The next regular release, numbered 26.09, is still planned for the end of September according to the project. Anyone moving to 26.06.7 now will therefore have to do it again in a few weeks. That argues for setting up the update route cleanly once instead of hunting for it each time.

The project's instruction, translated literally, reads: verify the signatures of the program files, install, restart. That order is not decoration. A signature is a cryptographic endorsement with which the developers confirm that a file comes from them unaltered. Without that check a security update would make the ideal bait: the user expects a new file, actively looks for it and installs it with elevated privileges.
In this case the reason is unusually concrete. Because the source code is being withheld, nobody can trace what sits inside the file during the first two weeks. The signature is therefore, for the time being, the only indication of provenance. Anyone updating through a ready-made package does not download it personally and leaves that check to the package provider, which shifts the task rather than removing it.
As soon as the source code is out in the open, the software can be rebuilt from it and compared with the file that has been running for two weeks. If the two match, it is retrospectively documented that the signed file contained nothing other than what the project published. Anyone can take that second step, and the project's assurance rests on precisely that.
The --offline switch is a start-up option of the node software. The project describes its effect as follows: it removes the attack path by taking away any means for attackers to address the node at all, while the program keeps running and keeps reading the blockchain in order to detect attempted fraud.
In practice that means the node accepts no more connections from outside and opens none itself. You can neither send nor receive payments, and other people's routed payments no longer pass through you. Everything happening on the blockchain, by contrast, your node still sees, and it can react to it.
The price is therefore stated plainly: the availability of your channels ends for as long as the switch is set. For a private node that is an inconvenience. For a node through which other people's payments regularly run, it is a loss of income. CryptoSlate points out that enough delayed updates and shut-down nodes could noticeably reduce routing capacity in parts of the network.
Here lies the point at which well-meant advice does damage. The obvious reaction to a security warning is: turn the device off. On a Lightning node that is the worse of two options, and the reason lies in the construction of payment channels.
A payment channel is secured by the last jointly signed balance. Either side can close the channel unilaterally at any time via the blockchain, which is known as a force close. If a counterparty submits an old balance more favourable to itself in the process, that is an attempted fraud. A challenge period protects against it: within an agreed window the injured side may submit a penalty transaction and in that case receives the entire contents of the channel.
That period runs in block time rather than calendar time, and it runs regardless of whether your machine is on. A node that has been switched off does not read the blockchain, does not notice the attempted fraud and misses the deadline. That is exactly what the project means by saying a shut-down node cannot do this job. The offline mode, by contrast, leaves the program running and the chain being read and takes away only the connections.
A watchtower is a monitoring service that observes the blockchain on your behalf and submits the penalty transaction in the event of fraud while your own node sleeps. Anyone who has set up such a service is better placed during a downtime. You should not rely on it, because many private nodes run without one, and setting it up is no incidental step.
Many private nodes run on ready-made packages with an interface rather than on the command line. There you will not find --offline as a button in the dashboard; it is a start-up option of the application. The route through the app store therefore has a story of its own here, and it can be read off the Umbrel entry.
An interim release numbered 26.06.6-patch.1 appeared there first, on August 27. Its note explained that the node kept running and kept watching the Bitcoin blockchain, but for the time being could not send, receive or forward Lightning payments. The instruction attached to it was clear: leave Core Lightning running and do not remove it, the next update would appear as usual once the repair was ready.
On August 29 came 26.06.7, with the note that this was an important security update and that the node would automatically reconnect to the Lightning network afterwards. For users of such packages that means two things. The offline mode may already have arrived automatically, without anyone flipping a switch. And full functionality returns only with the second update. If you have been wondering for a few days why a payment will not go through, here is the explanation.

An embargo in this context is an agreed blackout period during which the technical details of a vulnerability are not published. That is customary between reporter and vendor ahead of the repair. Here the case is different: the repair has already shipped, and the source code nevertheless stays under wraps until September 11, 2026, fourteen days after delivery.
The reasoning is practical. From a published repair the flaw it fixes can be reverse engineered. Whoever holds the source code sees which lines have changed and often knows sooner than the defender where the attack begins. TFTC's report attributes this reasoning to CLN lead developer Christian Decker: the technical details are being held back precisely in order to stop attackers from building a working exploit out of them.
Against that it can be argued that open-source software derives its very verifiability from the fact that anyone can read along. For two weeks a file is running on the nodes whose contents nobody outside the project can follow. Both sides have an argument, and both refer to the same period. The dispute can be settled only after September 11, when a comparison between the source code and the delivered file becomes possible.
The trigger of this episode is as remarkable as its course. The flaws did not come out of a planned audit. They arrived as a flood of reports generated with AI tools. Part of it was waste, part of it was genuine, and telling the two apart cost the project weeks.
For software maintained by volunteers that is a new burden. Whoever receives reports has to examine every single one, because a genuine finding overlooked would be the most expensive mistake of all. At the same time the effort on the side of those producing such reports falls towards zero. The balance between attack and defence shifts noticeably as a result.
Core Lightning is no isolated case in this. TFTC places the episode in a series and names August 3 as an earlier example, when the swap service Boltz suspended its swaps citing AI-assisted attacks. Anyone following recent weeks knows the pattern from the hardware corner too: we recently described how BitBox02 closed three security vulnerabilities with firmware 9.26.5 and why, with Coldcard, the old seed should not be reused in every case after a firmware update. How quickly you install a security update has thereby moved from a fringe topic to a routine.
An episode like this does not imply that self-custody is a mistake. What follows from it is a division that pays off independently of this case: a Lightning node is a device permanently attached to the network, accepting connections from strangers and needing keys while it operates. Such a system remains a hot system, however carefully it is maintained.
From that follows a plain split of your holdings. What belongs in the payment channel is the amount you actually need for payments. Everything beyond that belongs in storage whose keys never sit on a machine with a network connection, of the kind our comparison of hardware wallets describes. The homework that goes with it is backing up the recovery words, on which we have gathered what steel, passphrase and multisig really achieve.
The second conclusion concerns speed. Between the warning and the repaired release lay roughly two days according to the available figures. Anyone who hears nothing of the warning in that time, because they follow neither the project nor their package source, drops out of the window. A notification route that has been set up belongs to the equipment of self-run infrastructure rather than to its comforts.
--offline and catch up on the update afterwards. If you are not sure at all which software sits behind your Lightning payment, the comparison of software wallets clears that up.The solid evidence sits in the project's notice on release 26.06.7 (Blockstream, August 28, 2026) and in the Umbrel app store entry with the notes on both updates (Umbrel App Store).
(As of August 30, 2026. This article is not investment advice. Prices and fee structures change; check the terms with the provider before you buy.)
Gabriel Perez used his access to Trump's speeches before delivery to bet on "presidential mention market" contracts, profiting more than $107,500 before the CFTC caught up with him.
The Austin and Kyoto hard forks, deployed quietly on the Bor and Heimdall clients before public disclosure, closed denial-of-service and consensus-hardening flaws that Polygon says were never exploited.
Spot Bitcoin ETFs shed $201.9 million on Aug. 28, ending a nine-day inflow run, even as Ethereum funds extended a 10-day streak with fresh cash.
A Bitcoin rally to around $79,000 lifted the company's 840,447 BTC roughly $2.8 billion above its cost basis, as Saylor's "We're Back" post fueled speculation that Strategy may resume buying.
More than 100 AI, security, finance, and technology organizations want governments and industry to prepare for attacks powered by increasingly capable models.
Market feels stronger than any point in 2026, however, the clear picture is yet to be painted out there.
Ripple Chief Legal Officer Stuart Alderoty has argued that passing the CLARITY Act could boost job creation and economic growth in the United States.
Gold investor and longtime Bitcoin critic Peter Schiff has renewed his criticism of the cryptocurrency.
XRP at decisive moment as its next move might depend on it holding 3.2 billion support.
AI agents push XRPL into a 105% wallet imbalance, swapping volatile XRP for stable RLUSD as microtransaction costs spike.
The European Central Bank wants a tokenized euro to anchor Europe’s emerging blockchain markets. Executive Board member Isabel Schnabel backed directly issued, programmable reserves at Jackson Hole on Friday. Her proposal concerns wholesale money that banks use, not household deposits or the planned retail digital euro.
That distinction defines the threat facing stablecoins in Europe. ECB money could dominate regulated securities settlement without erasing private tokens from payments, trading, or cross-border transfers.
Pontes, the Eurosystem’s near-term project, launches in September. It will link market ledgers with TARGET Services before moving finality onto a Eurosystem blockchain. It targets institutional markets first.
Schnabel’s argument starts with settlement safety and liquidity. A stablecoin issuer can hold strong reserves and offer reliable redemption.
During panic, though, it cannot create fresh liquidity when every holder wants cash. Only a central bank can expand reserves immediately and preserve settlement at par.
She connected that limit to America’s 1907 banking panic. Then, banknote supply depended on government-bond holdings and failed to meet sudden cash demand.
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created a more elastic public backstop. Her Jackson Hole speech therefore described stablecoins as complements to central bank money, rather than substitutes.
That position targets the settlement layer, not every stablecoin use. Private tokens still provide exchange liquidity, wallet transfers, remittances, and access to decentralized markets.
MiCA also gives compliant issuers a regulated route into European payments. Still, the tokenized euro could weaken their case within institutional securities markets.
Banks may prefer a direct ECB claim over tokens carrying issuer, custody, operational, and redemption risks. That preference becomes stronger when tokenized deposits offer similar programmability. Current DeFiLlama market data place total stablecoin supply near $304.6 billion. Dollar tokens dominate that market.
Euro-pegged tokens remain below $1 billion, leaving Europe dependent on dollar-based blockchain liquidity. The tokenized euro would give markets a publicly controlled settlement anchor.
Pontes will not place every settlement function directly on-chain at launch. Its initial model connects market DLT platforms with TARGET Services.
Participants can settle using cash tokens on a Eurosystem ledger or complete the cash leg in T2. Legal finality initially occurs in T2, the euro area’s real-time gross settlement system.
The ECB Pontes design also uses Hash-Link for synchronized delivery-versus-payment transactions. Later upgrades will add smart contracts, continuous operations, and finality on the Eurosystem platform. At that point, the tokenized euro could support programmable repo operations and automated collateral calls.
The ECB could inject liquidity, change collateral rules, or adjust rates within the same environment. This control explains Schnabel’s preference for directly issued reserves. Bridges and omnibus tokens keep direct reserves outside the ledger, limiting coded monetary operations.
The Eurosystem already tested demand between May and November 2024. Sixty-four participants across nine jurisdictions completed 58 payment and securities use cases. They settled nearly €1.6 billion in central bank money, ECB findings show.
Pontes initially serves eligible financial institutions and licensed market operators. It neither gives households an ECB balance nor replaces compliant exchange tokens.
Institutional platforms may choose the tokenized euro when both assets and cash become programmable. This change could narrow stablecoin demand for tokenized bonds, funds, equities, and repo. It would not erase uses where portability, open access, or cross-platform reach matters more.
Appia will decide the architecture by 2028. It is considering one shared ledger, a central-bank ledger linked to private networks, or several interoperable ledgers.
France’s Lise, Europe’s first licensed fully tokenized stock exchange, shows why access and infrastructure design matter. The tokenized euro could then strengthen public settlement without eliminating private money’s specialist roles. Appia still must balance liquidity, resilience, governance, competition, and technological concentration.
The post ECB Tokenized Euro Plan Unlikely to Kill Stablecoins in Europe appeared first on Blockonomi.
Stellar’s expansion in tokenized real-world assets contrasts with subdued XLM price performance. The Stellar RWA market reached $3.996 billion on Aug. 29, up roughly 360% during 2026. That total stood at $868.8 million when 2025 ended. Meanwhile, XLM traded near $0.18 after retreating from its August move above $0.20.
The token hovered close to its 50-day exponential moving average, leaving traders focused on immediate support. Institutional products now drive much of Stellar’s growth across government debt, money funds, and private credit. Still, the asset total measures issued value, not automatic demand for XLM. That distinction explains the widening performance gap.
Market data from a Stellar-maintained Dune dashboard tracks the climb across several regulated asset categories. The Stellar RWA market first crossed $1 billion in January, then passed $2 billion in April. It exceeded $3 billion during June before approaching the next threshold in August.

Issuer figures also reveal concentration behind the headline total. Spiko held about $1.55 billion on Stellar by Aug. 27, making it the largest contributor. Realiz followed with $559 million, while Tradable held $548 million. Franklin Templeton and Ondo added $546 million and $535 million, respectively.
Those five issuers represented approximately $3.74 billion combined, or most of the network total. Therefore, the Stellar RWA market reflects major institutional allocations alongside broader product diversity. Tokenized real-world assets span Treasurys, public and private credit, and sovereign securities outside the United States. Still, issuer concentration leaves the headline figure sensitive to large redemptions or migrations.
Stellar also hosted roughly $490 million in non-U.S. government debt by Aug. 20. The Stellar Development Foundation cited Mexican CETES and Brazilian government bonds among those instruments. Etherfuse supports the sovereign products, extending tokenization beyond dollar-based Treasury exposure.
DTCC plans to support DTC-tokenized assets on Stellar during the first half of 2027. The service retains traditional ownership rights, protections, and entitlements for participating investors.
Tradable separately agreed to bring up to $1 billion in private credit onto Stellar. Its platform handles compliance, investor onboarding, and deal operations for institutional assets. Stellar recorded $11.4 billion in stablecoin transfers during the second quarter, up 72% from the prior quarter.
XLM price traded around $0.18, slightly above the 50-day EMA near $0.1781. That zone now acts as a short-term pivot after the token pulled back from August’s $0.20 rally. A daily break below $0.178 could expose the mid-August region near $0.16. Conversely, buyers must hold the average before challenging nearby supply.

Momentum readings show neither strong exhaustion nor a confirmed breakout. The 14-day relative strength index stood near 52, just above its neutral midpoint. That reading gives buyers a narrow edge, but it offers little evidence of sustained acceleration. The first resistance band sits between $0.19 and $0.20.
A clean move above $0.20 could reopen the August peak near $0.22. The chart then places heavier historical resistance between $0.23 and $0.24. Repeated rejection below $0.20 would keep XLM inside its current consolidation range. The Stellar RWA market alone cannot confirm either technical outcome.
Tokenized real-world assets can grow without matching purchases of the network’s native token. Issuers may hold asset tokens while using relatively little XLM for low-cost network fees. Moreover, market capitalization measures outstanding token value, not turnover, transactions, or fee spending. The Stellar RWA market therefore signals institutional adoption more directly than token demand.
Price confirmation still depends on trading activity around defined chart levels. A close above $0.20 would strengthen short-term structure, while $0.178 marks the immediate downside marker. Below that average, the next visible support rests around $0.16.
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XRP traded at $1.396 on August 29, marking a notable shift in market structure. The token sits roughly 39% above the $1.00 level it held through August 18, though still about 8% below its recent high of $1.520 on August 23.
Binance open interest for XRP peaked near $558 million during that session before easing to $483 million. The rally appears driven by derivatives activity rather than exchange supply movement, based on recent on-chain data.
Funding rates for XRP averaged 0.006 over the recent stretch, well above the quarterly baseline. The estimated leverage ratio climbed to 0.193, close to the six-month maximum of 0.213. That combination points to derivatives traders, not spot sellers, powering the recent repricing.
Long liquidations rose sharply alongside the rally. They averaged $4.34 million, up 222% week over week. A single session on August 22 saw $25.7 million in long liquidations, the largest of the six-month window.

Source: Cryptoquant
That liquidation spike came on a day when the price closed higher. Rising prices alongside rising long liquidations usually signal crowded positions being cleared within an uptrend. It does not typically signal a reversal against the trend.
Exchange data tells a separate story. Binance inflows averaged 136,319 XRP over the past week, while outflows averaged 298,660 XRP. Both figures are near 2% and 4% of their six-month averages, a sharp drop from typical activity levels.
Deposit addresses on Binance fell to 45, a 91% decline versus the quarterly baseline. The exchange reserve itself barely moved, up just 0.04% week over week to $2.618 billion. Holders appear to be sitting still rather than preparing to sell.
Total XRP transactions rose to 2.93 million daily, up 97% versus the quarterly average and near a six-month high. Network usage expanded even as coins avoided exchange-bound transfers. NVT climbed 44% week over week alongside that activity increase.
Funding has already started cooling, dropping from 0.010 to 0.002 across three sessions. Open interest is down 13% from its recent peak. Leverage is unwinding while spot supply continues to stay off exchanges.
This setup has historically preceded one of two outcomes for XRP. Either a base-building phase emerges once positioning normalizes, or a faster retracement follows if exchange reserves begin climbing again. The direction likely depends on which side dominates first.
Retail sentiment on social platforms reflects a similar wait-and-see posture. Analyst Diana (@InvestWithD) pointed to the $1.38 area as a key Fibonacci support zone tied to a broader Elliott Wave count.
The post noted that a 4-hour RSI reading near 47.5 had moved back above its signal line, suggesting early momentum shifts near support rather than during an overbought run.
Price action around that support level may determine whether XRP builds a new base or slips toward lower levels in the sessions ahead. Traders appear to be watching exchange reserve trends closely for the next signal.
The post XRP Rallies on Derivatives Leverage as Exchange Supply Stays Locked appeared first on Blockonomi.
Kalshi has reportedly secured an exclusive prediction-market partnership with the US Open, expanding its sports footprint while legal disputes over event contracts intensify. Front Office Sports reported Sunday that the agreement takes effect immediately, citing two people familiar with the deal.
The agreement was finalized after qualifying ended last week, although financial terms and its full scope were not disclosed. The timing accelerated the USTA’s earlier plan to consider prediction-market partnerships for 2027 and beyond.
New USTA CEO Craig Tiley reportedly played a central role in bringing the joint effort forward to 2026. Tiley began his tenure July 20 after spending 21 years at Tennis Australia. The USTA hired him to expand tennis participation and strengthen the commercial reach of the US Open.
Under the reported agreement, rival prediction-market platforms would face advertising restrictions inside the venue and across television coverage. One source told Front Office Sports that competing platforms would be blocked from advertising at the tournament or on ESPN broadcasts.
That exclusivity could increase Kalshi’s visibility during one of tennis’s four Grand Slam events. ESPN holds exclusive US Open broadcast rights across ESPN, ESPN2, ESPN Deportes, ABC and its streaming platforms. Every match is also available through the ESPN App.
The broadcaster’s 12-year agreement with the USTA keeps the tournament on ESPN through 2037. However, neither Kalshi nor the USTA had publicly announced the deal by Sunday afternoon. Kalshi was also absent from the tournament’s official partner list at that time.
Earlier Sunday, the company published women’s singles analysis with a disclaimer denying US Open or WTA affiliation. The partnership follows a broader push by Kalshi into major American sports properties. On Aug. 25, it announced agreements with five Major League Baseball teams.
Those teams were the Atlanta Braves, Boston Red Sox, Los Angeles Dodgers, San Diego Padres and San Francisco Giants. Kalshi said baseball-related trading volume had risen 36-fold year over year.
The Dodgers and Red Sox separately described their deals as multi-year and exclusive. Their arrangements include branding, digital promotions and fan activations at two prominent baseball venues.
The expansion comes as courts remain divided over whether states may regulate sports event contracts offered on federally regulated prediction markets. KalshiEX operates as a CFTC-regulated designated contract market.
The CFTC reaffirmed that status in a February enforcement advisory addressing misuse of nonpublic information on prediction markets. Yet federal appellate courts have reached conflicting conclusions on state authority.
In April, the Third Circuit ruled that New Jersey could not apply its gambling laws to Kalshi’s federally regulated contracts. On Friday, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite result involving Nevada.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that Nevada could enforce its gambling laws against the company. Reuters reported that the conflicting decisions could increase the likelihood of Supreme Court review.
That legal backdrop gives the reported US Open partnership added significance. The singles main draw began Aug. 30 and runs through Sept. 13 in New York. If formally confirmed, the agreement would place Kalshi before a major tennis audience while blocking direct prediction-market rivals from tournament advertising.
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Spectra is bringing fixed-rate markets and tradable yield to the Stellar network, adding a new layer to its onchain economy.
The protocol splits yield-bearing assets into two separate tokens. One token carries fixed returns, while the other tracks variable yield exposure.
Stellar’s Security Audit Bank lists a completed Certora audit dated May 18, 2026, for the integration. The addition follows Stellar’s steady expansion across tokenized assets, lending and settlement infrastructure this year.
Spectra describes itself as an open, permissionless interest-rate derivatives protocol. Its design takes a yield-bearing asset and divides it into two components.
These components are known as the Principal Token and the Yield Token. Once split, each piece can trade independently on its own market.
The Principal Token, or PT, represents the fixed-yield side of the arrangement. Holders buy the principal at a discount to its face value.
At maturity, that token can be redeemed for its full fixed value. This structure gives users a predictable return over a set period.
The Yield Token, or YT, works differently from its counterpart. It gives holders exposure specifically to the future yield of the underlying asset.
Rather than owning the asset itself, traders gain a claim on what it earns. This effectively allows the yield to be traded as its own instrument.
Crypto commentator Marco Salzmann framed this as part of a broader pattern building on Stellar. He described the network’s stack as moving through tokenized assets, lending, yield markets and settlement.
Spectra’s arrival adds another financial primitive to that sequence. Each layer, he noted, builds on the capital already sitting onchain.
Stellar’s Security Audit Bank provides independent confirmation of the integration timeline. It lists an entry titled “Spectra – Interest Rate Markets on Stellar.”
The associated Certora audit was completed on May 18, 2026. That listing indicates the groundwork for deployment has already been reviewed.
Salzmann pointed to Stellar’s broader environment as a reason the protocol fits well there. The network has drawn real-world assets, stablecoins and institutional financial products in recent periods.
It has also been expanding its decentralized finance infrastructure alongside that growth. Interest-rate markets add a further tool for participants managing that capital.
Spectra is not the only protocol pursuing this type of infrastructure on Stellar. XCCY is separately integrating a fixed-rate engine designed for similar purposes.
That engine targets fixed yield, fixed-rate borrowing and hedging against variable interest rates. Both efforts point toward growing demand for interest-rate tools on the network.
The Stellar Development Foundation’s 2026 strategy focuses on bringing more capital onchain. It also emphasizes increasing how efficiently existing onchain assets are used. Fixed-rate markets and separable yield exposure support both of those stated goals.
As more asset types settle on Stellar, tools like Spectra give holders more ways to manage risk and return, rather than holding a single fixed exposure to whatever yield the market happens to produce at any given time.
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DeFi tokens have climbed nearly 38% since August 17 as investors reassess how US crypto policy could affect protocol revenue and token value.
SoSoValue says the rally is moving DeFi closer to a market where fees, buybacks and on-chain activity can play a larger role in how tokens are valued.
In a post on X, SoSoValue said its DeFi sector index, $DEFI.ssi, rose from 0.3616 on August 17 to around 0.498 after reaching 0.511, for a cumulative gain of about 37.7%.
The move came alongside Bitcoin and Ethereum’s recovery and broader short covering, but the research firm argues that investors are also reassessing whether mature DeFi protocols can return more of their revenue to tokenholders.
That issue has limited DeFi valuations for years. Protocols could generate substantial trading fees, lending income, and other revenue while tokenholders had little direct claim on those economics.
Fee distributions and buybacks could also create securities-law concerns in the US, leaving many protocols reluctant to activate mechanisms that tie revenue to their tokens. But that may be changing, considering that last week, the SEC proposed its “Regulation Crypto Assets” framework, which includes exemptions and a conditional safe harbor for certain crypto-asset offerings.
Under the proposal, once a project has completed or permanently stopped the essential managerial work it had promised, its token may no longer remain part of an investment contract.
The Senate’s CLARITY Act draft goes further for DeFi, with protections for noncontrolling developers, validators, node operators, oracle providers and self-custody wallet software.
That draft also leaves room for rewards linked to trading, staking, governance, and liquidity provision. However, it still needs 60 votes in the Senate, while the SEC proposal is subject to public comment, but according to SoSoValue, markets are already assigning more confidence to the direction of US policy, even though legal certainty is still not there.
When you consider protocol revenue, the case becomes even more interesting, with Uniswap generating about $7.18 million during the past 30 days, followed by PancakeSwap at $5.16 million, Jupiter at $4.69 million, Aave at $4.12 million, and Aerodrome at $4.11 million.
Several of these protocols now have mechanisms that connect those economics to their tokens. For example, Hyperliquid uses part of trading fees to buy HYPE, Uniswap has linked revenue to UNI burns, and Jupiter allocates 50% of protocol fees to JUP purchases. PancakeSwap also uses part of its fees for CAKE buybacks and burns.
Meanwhile, Ethena has proposed an even larger allocation. Once USDe reaches its stated supply threshold, 95% of net revenue paid to the foundation across its three core business lines would go towards ENA buybacks.
According to SoSoValue, the next phase depends on whether those protocol revenues keep rising and whether tokenholders can get a larger share of it.
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Crypto company BitGo has officially acquired NYDIG’s Bitcoin-focused institutional trading business. The deal was signed and completed on Thursday and reported on Friday, paying $7 million in cash and about $35.5 million in stock at closing, with up to $15 million more in cash tied to two revenue milestones.
The purchase brings NYDIG’s derivatives, structured products, financing, and capital markets operations to the custody company, along with roughly 30 employees.
Around 250 institutional client relationships were moved across, though they appear in the 8-K filed the same day, which also grants seller NYDIG IHC LLC earn-out shares on the second milestone and sets aside staff retention awards targeting $5 million each in stock and cash.
“Institutions increasingly want to work with a trusted partner that can support the full lifecycle of digital assets,” said Mike Belshe, CEO and Co-founder of BitGo. The firm went public on the NYSE at the start of the year and had a market value below $1 billion as of Thursday, per CNBC.
NYDIG, an affiliate of Stone Ridge Holdings Group, said the sale lets it concentrate on power generation, Bitcoin mining and high-performance computing data centers, a development pipeline it puts above 3 gigawatts, with more than 1 gigawatt deliverable in 2027 and 2028.
“Our team built NYDIG’s institutional trading business into something exceptional: proven execution expertise with derivatives and financing capabilities,” said Tejas Shah, CEO of NYDIG, adding that the data center business is “where we see one of the most significant opportunities ahead.”
Belshe went on CNBC’s Squawk Box on Friday, days after Bitcoin briefly topped $80,000. Asked about a crypto winter, he said the markets “have had high highs and low lows” while “the thesis behind Bitcoin continues to grow,” pointing to tokenized equity plans from Morgan Stanley, Charles Schwab and DTCC.
.@BitGo CEO @mikebelshe breaks down its acquisition of $BTC miner NYDIG: https://t.co/coIINsM3RZ pic.twitter.com/ZqyUsNCkOu
— Squawk Box (@SquawkCNBC) August 28, 2026
On the CLARITY Act, which faces a Senate cloture vote on September 15, Belshe said everyone should want the market structure bill to pass. “This is what gives a legislative path forward to help rein that in, prevent any FTX from ever happening again,” he said, estimating 12 to 18 months of rulemaking after passage and noting he was at the White House with President Trump last week.
Belshe confirmed BitGo runs infrastructure for USD1, the stablecoin behind the Trump family’s World Liberty Financial, and said BitGo just received a license in South Korea. “People don’t realize this, but America actually is behind,” he added.
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Crypto platforms have lost more than $3.63 billion to security incidents between January 2025 and July 2026. CoinGecko documented 245 attacks during the period.
The 10 largest incidents accounted for more than 72.5% of the total amount stolen, demonstrating that a relatively small number of major breaches drove most of the losses. Infrastructure and supply-chain vulnerabilities were the biggest sources of damage across both centralized exchanges and decentralized exchanges. Combined losses exceeded $1.8 billion.
Security failures involving Bybit and KelpDAO were notable examples. CoinGecko also found that the main weaknesses differ depending on how platforms are built.
For centralized exchanges, compromised private keys remained the most common point of failure, while decentralized applications lost $546 million through sophisticated smart contract exploits. Both centralized and decentralized platforms, however, remain exposed to oracle and market manipulation, with errors in internal mechanisms causing major losses for platforms including Bitget, Binance and Hyperliquid.
Upon examining the role of security checks, the report found that having an independent audit did not prevent many of the incidents. Of the 245 attacks recorded since early 2025, 147 involved protocols that had undergone audits before they were compromised. In fact, these audited platforms accounted for over 88% of the total capital drained during the 19-month period.
Conventional audits often do not cover the areas exploited in major attacks. Many incidents involved external infrastructure, unaudited code changes, or systemic features that were manipulated through governance attacks. Only about 11% of the incidents involving audited platforms were linked to smart contract vulnerabilities that fell within the audit scope, although those flaws still caused $396 million in losses.
CEXes generally do not use the same audit model as decentralized protocols and instead rely on compliance measures and financial attestations such as Proof-of-Reserve. However, CoinGecko said that such safeguards provide limited protection against social engineering and severe private-key security failures.
Even as exploits increased, active coverage across leading crypto insurance protocols has declined 20.2%, falling from $163.2 million to $130.2 million. Cumulative payouts have remained largely unchanged at $33 million. The report said high risks in the sector may have discouraged users from supplying capital or buying coverage at higher premium prices.
Crypto insurance can also have a narrow scope, as claims are often limited to verified smart contract exploits or infrastructure failures. Losses linked to human error, compromised private keys, or market volatility may not qualify.
As of August 2026, five of nine on-chain insurance protocols had become inactive or moved to other segments.
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Bitcoin’s powerful breakout has lost some of its initial momentum after reaching the $80K region. With both spot price action and futures activity showing reduced conviction, BTC appears increasingly likely to enter a choppy consolidation phase before establishing its next major directional move.
Bitcoin’s daily structure remains substantially stronger following the impulsive breakout from the $64K-$65K region. The rally pushed the price above both major moving averages shown on the chart and decisively cleared the $65.9K-$67.1K and $72K-$74.4K resistance zones.
However, bullish momentum has faded after BTC reached the major $80.5K-$82.5K supply zone. Several recent candles show hesitation beneath this area, with Bitcoin currently hovering above $78K. This suggests that buyers have not yet generated enough follow-through to force another decisive expansion.
The broader structure remains bullish while BTC stays above the reclaimed $72K-$74.4K zone, but the immediate outlook appears more neutral. Continued weakness in momentum could result in sideways and volatile price action between this support area and the $80.5K-$82.5K resistance zone.
A decisive break above $82.5K would favor bullish continuation. Conversely, losing the $72K-$74.4K region would represent a more meaningful deterioration in the post-breakout structure.

The 4-hour timeframe provides a clearer indication that short-term momentum is weakening. Following the initial surge, Bitcoin formed a rising channel beneath the $80K-$82K resistance area. The asset has now broken below the channel’s lower boundary, interrupting the sequence of higher lows.
Despite this breakdown, BTC has not accelerated significantly lower and is instead stabilizing around $77K-$78K. This lack of bearish follow-through reinforces the possibility of choppy consolidation rather than an immediate large correction.
For buyers to regain short-term control, Bitcoin would need to reclaim the broken channel and push back through the $80K region. Until that occurs, the recent highs around $80K-$82K remain the primary resistance zone.
On the downside, the $72K-$74.4K area represents the most important nearby support. With momentum fading on both sides, BTC could continue fluctuating between these broader boundaries while the market searches for sufficient liquidity to establish its next trend.

The Bitcoin Futures Average Order Size chart supports the lack-of-momentum scenario. The metric categorizes futures activity according to the relative size of orders, providing insight into whether whales, smaller participants, or more ordinary flows are dominating trading.
The latest readings are predominantly classified as normal orders, with no sustained cluster of large whale activity visible at the end of the chart. This indicates that major futures participants are not showing particularly strong directional conviction despite Bitcoin trading near $78K.
Combined with the hesitation visible in spot price action, the absence of notable large futures orders suggests participation is currently insufficient to support another highly impulsive move. Neither aggressive demand nor overwhelming supply appears dominant.
As a result, Bitcoin may remain vulnerable to low-momentum, volatile consolidation in the short term. A renewed concentration of large whale orders alongside a breakout from the current spot range would provide a stronger indication that directional momentum is returning.
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The winds of change continue to impact how investors view the spot XRP ETFs, with the inflows in the past week exceeding $110 million for the first time since early December, 2025.
Naturally, the cumulative total net inflows have reached a new all-time high, while Bitwise’s XRP ETF has extended its lead as the largest of the bunch.
On a rare occasion in the past several months, all five trading days saw double-digit net inflows. Investors kicked off the week by pouring $13.82 million on Monday and another $23.87 million on Tuesday. The most impressive day was Wednesday, when the net inflows hit $28.14 million. This was the single-best daily performance since January 5, when the funds attracted over $46 million.
Another $18.47 million entered the funds on Thursday, and $26.20 million on Friday. This brought the total for the week to $110.49 million – the best five-day performance since the week that ended on December 5.
The cumulative total net inflow reached $1.66 billion on Friday, a new all-time high following last week’s market shift, when investors returned to the XRP ETF scene. Before that, there were multiple examples of days with no actual net flows.

Bitwise’s XRP ETF remains the largest, with the cumulative net inflows skyrocketing to just over $600 million. The first to see the light of day, Canary Capital’s XRPC, follows suit with $483 million, while Franklin’s XRPZ is third with $462.86 million.
The underlying asset exploded between August 19 and 22, surging from the key psychological support at $1.00 to a multi-month high of $1.70. After gaining 70% in less than 72 hours, though, the asset slumped to $1.50 at the start of the business week.
Despite the impressive inflows mentioned above, it couldn’t maintain that level and dipped to and below $1.40 by the end of the week. It currently fights to reclaim that level after a 1.3% increase on a 24-hour scale.
Analysts believe the next move will depend on whether XRP can defend the $1.35-$1.38 support zone, which was tested on Friday after Kevin Warsh’s hawkish speech. If the token is to rebound, the first major obstacle it needs to overcome to continue upward is at $1.60, which is a level that has frequently stopped its breakout attempts in the past six months.
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